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Abstract 
 
Performance-based contracting (PBC) is playing an increasingly important role in the defense industry of 
the United States of America. Being faced with sustainment costs up to two or three times the 
development and production costs of the weapon systems, a new sustainment strategy was needed. 
The Department of Defense introduced this new strategy in 2003 under the name Performance Based 
Logistics. According to the United States Defense Acquisition University, “the essence of performance- 
based contracting is buying performance, instead of the traditional approach of buying individual parts 
or repair actions. This is accomplished through business relationships that are structured to meet the 
warfighter’s operational needs and align support objectives with required performance outcomes and 
available resources”. Simply put, performance based strategies buy outcomes, not products or services. 
Ever since the introduction performance-based contracting is reshaping service support supply chains in 
capital-intensive industries such as aerospace and defense. 
 
Risk plays and important role in performance-based contracting as it changes the nature of the risk and 
its allocation. In performance-based contracting, the risk is shifted away from the customer and on to 
the contractor. This shift raises important questions concerning the identification and management of 
risks under performance-based contracting. To date, little empirical research is performed on the 
management of risk under performance-based contracting. It remains unclear which factors affects the 
contractor’s willingness to bear PBC-induced risks and how these risks are or should be handled in 
practice. This study aims to provide insight into what risk factors are managed under a practice of 
performance-based contracting. The problem statement of this study is: 
 
What factors influence the service provider’s willingness to take PBC-induced risks and how are these 
risks managed in a service supply chain? 
 
In order to answer this question, a case study was conducted at the Joint Program Office of the F-35 
Lightning II. More specific, the study focuses on the PBC relationship between the manufacturer of the 
engine of the F-35, the F135: Pratt & Whitney and the Joint Program Office. In this relationship, Pratt & 
Whitney is the service provider and the Joint Program Office the customer; both a unit of analysis in this 
study. An embedded single case design was adopted. A defensible choice as the case is both an extreme 
and revelatory. 
 
This case study starts with a study of the published literature on PBC. The study allowed us to build on 
three established concepts: Service Supply Chain Management, PBC and the agency theory. To explicate 
our expectations and provide direction in the study, seven propositions on PBC were composed, three 
on PBC characteristics and four on the factors influencing provider’s willingness to bear PBC induced 
risks. The main elements of these propositions were operationalized to accurately define the variables 
into measurable factors. 
 
The necessary case study data was collected through semi-structured interviews and review of 
organizational documents. An interview guide was created and used during the interviews. It served two 
objectives: first, it gave information and guidance on the course of the interview and it make sure the 
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right information was gathered during the interviews. Secondly, repeating the exact same modus 
operandi each and every interview increased the reliability of this study. 
 
The interviewees were key-informants spanning several positions in both organizations, such as the 
procurement officer, contracting officer, account manager, business development manager and 
managing director from the service providers and customer. This case study incorporates the data of 
seven interviews. The open-ended designed questions allowed interviewees to develop and share their 
own views on PBC and its risk implications. All interviews were recorded and transcribed to maintain a 
chain of evidence. The interviewees were given the opportunity to correct possible errors in 
interpretation or transcription. A qualitative research program called NVivo was used as a case study 
database to maintain the chain of evidence. NVivo was also used for coding the transcriptions and 
facilitated the pattern matching process. The pattern matching process was conducted within the unit of 
analysis, across the units of analysis, and furthermore between the organizational documents. 
 
The study yielded interesting results. Especially concerning the factors influencing the service provider’s 
willingness to bear and manage PBC induced risk in an ever changing environment with a large amount 
of uncertainty. Regarding the propositions on the PBC characteristics, the study endorses that in PBC risk 
is transferred from the customer to the service provider, and the customer incentivizes the  
performance. The two other propositions on the PBC characteristics could not be supported. In the 
performance work statement, the financial risks are not largely transferred to the service provider. The 
reason for this is that the current contract is a transitional contract towards a full performance contract. 
Similarly, this study could not support the proposition that more PBC constituents in a contract, would 
led the service provider behave more in the interests of the customer. The reason for this is that it is too 
early in the process to notice any behavioral change. Besides that, this transitional contract is a 
steppingstone towards a full performance contract. 
 
Concerning the factors influencing the service provider’s willingness, not all four factors found in the 
literature could be supported by this study. The service provider’s performance attributability, however, 
was indeed found to be a strong factor influencing the service provider’s willingness. In addition, this 
study showed two methods on how this factor can be managed, by exclusions and service levels 
agreements. The propositions on the service provider’s ability to transfer risk to subcontractors and to 
balance risk and reward across the SSC could only be partly supported. The main cause for this, is that 
the contracts between the service provider and subcontracts could not be used for verification. The data 
derived from the interviews however, did confirm these as factors. Although all interviewees agree 
relational governance and trust is important in PBC, the current performance work statement does not 
support this; the service provider is not given a large amount of control. 
 
More interestingly, the four factors obtained from literature were not the most prominent ones in this 
case (study). During the study three more factors were found that strongly influence the willingness: the 
chosen growth path towards toward full PBC, the ability to make accurate forecasts and the length of 
the contract. Although these factors are not completely unfamiliar in literature in relation to 
performance contracting, in this study their part is more prominent as they’re represented in present 
day literature. This could be explained by the specific (risk) characteristics of the studied case. 
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Simultaneously developing, producing and sustaining a major component as a jet engine on this scale is 
unprecedented and is accompanied with a unique risk pattern. 
 
In the end, this study identifies six factors affecting the service provider’s willingness to bear PBC- 
induced risks. In addition, this study showed how these factors were handled in practice. A service 
provider and customer, when engaging in a PBC relationship, should take these six factors in to 
consideration, especially in a changing (transforming) environment where there is substantial 
uncertainty. 
 
Because this is a single case, the results cannot be generalized. It will be interesting to see how the 
willingness factors and management of risk changes over time. It’s therefore recommended to replicate 
this study when both the technical system and the supply chain are in a stable, full grown state. 
Essentially making this a longitudinal case. Furthermore, it’s suggested to conduct this study with 
different customer and service provider relationships in order to compare the results. If these case 
studies produce the same result, this will expand the external generalizability of this study. It’s also 
recommended to conduct this study in a market situation where there is more competition to study the 
effects of competition on the factors influencing the service provider’s willingness to bear PBC induced 
risks. Because the contracts between the service provider and subcontractor could not be studied, two 
propositions could not be fully supported: transfer risk to the subcontractor(s) and balance risks across 
the service supply chain. It’s therefore recommended to conduct a study where these documents are 
part of the study. Additionally, it’s recommended to conduct an in-depth study on how risks are 
managed in other PBC relationships where the service provider does not have total control of the 
service performance. This in order to explore if the two managing techniques are also used in other 
situations and if there are other techniques to managing this risk factor. Lastly, this study identifies the 
applied growth path toward full PBC as a factor influencing the willingness of the service provider to 
bear PBC induced risk. In literature, this is not addressed as such. It’s recommended to study this in 
more detail. This could be performed in environments where a lack of (mature) data causes substantial 
uncertainty. 
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“Live as if you were to die tomorrow. Learn as if you were to live forever.” 
Mahatma Gandhi 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Problem statement 
 
The last decades a shift in importance can be observed from a goods and or manufacturing oriented 
industry towards a service oriented industry (Ellram, Tate, & Billington, 2004; Vargo & Lusch, 2004). In 
2013 the service industry accounted for about 76% and 78% percent of the gross domestic product of 
respectively the Netherlands and the United States (Bank, 2015). In recent years, this trend has 
influenced manufacturers to continuously expand their services (Roy, Baines, Lightfoot, Benedettini, & 
Kay, 2009) 
 
Goods-dominant firms are faced with declining sales, which has stimulated them to look at the service 
oriented industry for new market opportunities (Neu, 2005). This development is in line with the trend 
that companies tend to concentrate on their core activities (Dickson, Neu, & Brown, 2008). Goods- 
dominant firms have begun to consider offering services that support the activities of their customers, 
e.g. within the customer’s production process (Hypko, Tilebein, & Gleich, 2010b; Mathieu, 2001). 
Following this trend, manufacturing firms have integrated services into their initially goods-dominant 
product. In the future services will increasingly form the dominating core of manufacturers’ business 
models (Edvardsson, Holmlund, & Strandvik, 2008). 
 
Business services can be complex, entailing a high level of risk and uncertainty for the customer 
(Homburg & Stebel, 2009). For simple products as electronics and automobiles, maintenance services 
usually involve fixed payments for warranties. Complex systems require a more sophisticated 
relationship between the customer and the service supplier. It is a managerial challenge to design 
contracts that can cope with the pitfalls associated with uncertainty, transactions costs and opportunism 
that are typically involved in complex procurement projects (Caniëls, Gelderman, & Vermeulen, 2012; 
Williamson, 1991). In capital-intensive industries, such as aerospace and defense, significant 
uncertainties in cost and repair processes make it very hard to guarantee a predetermined service level 
or quote a price for providing it (Sang-Hyun Kim, 2007). Therefore, maintenance support in these 
industries typically involves cost-sharing arrangements, which include fixed-price and cost-plus  
contracts. Under the former, the customer pays a fixed fee to the supplier to purchase necessary parts 
and support services; under the latter, the customer compensates the supplier’s full cost and adds a 
premium. 
 
Performance-based contracting (PBC) appear to be increasingly adopted by practitioners (Hypko, 
Tilebein, & Gleich, 2010a; Hypko et al., 2010b; Sumo, van der Valk, Duysters, & van Weele, 2016). 
Performance-based contracts specify the desired outcome, while renouncing interference on how the 
services should be delivered or which resources should be used (Kim et al, 2007). The main benefit of 
such incomplete contracts are the flexibility and the responsibility that are rendered to the supplier. A 
recent literature review on performance-based contracting seems to confirm the trend towards 
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performance-based contracting and a growing number of scientific publications on the topic (Selviaridis 
& Norrman, 2015). In the last decade PBC is playing an increasingly important role in the defense 
industry of the United States (US). Being faced with sustainment costs up to two or three times the 
development and production costs of the weapon systems, a new sustainment strategy was needed 
(Randall, Pohlen, & Hanna, 2010). The Department of Defense (DoD) introduced this new strategy in 
2003 under the name of Performance Based Logistics (PBL) ((DAU), 2005a, pp. 2-4). According to the US 
Defense Acquisition University “the essence of performance-based contracting is buying performance, 
instead of the traditional approach of buying individual parts or repair actions. This is accomplished 
through business relationships that are structured to meet the warfighter’s operational needs and align 
support objectives with required performance outcomes and available resources. In 2011 the DoD 
reaffirmed their PBC policy as their preferred means to sustain their weapon systems ((DAU), 2011). 
Ever since the introduction performance-based contracting is reshaping service support supply chains in 
capital-intensive industries such as aerospace and defense (Kim, Cohen, & Netessine, 2007). 
 
Risk plays and important role in performance-based contracting as it changes the nature of the risk and 
its allocation. Risk can be defined as “the extent to which there is uncertainty about whether potentially 
significant and/or disappointing outcomes of decisions will be realized.” (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992, p. 10). In 
performance-based contracting the risk is shifted away from the customer and on to the contractor 
(Kleemann & Essig, 2013). This shift raises important questions concerning the identification and 
management of risks under performance-based contracting. To date, little empirical research has been 
carried out on the management of risk under performance-based contracting, even though projects are 
apparently being procured in this way (Gruneberg, Hughes, & Ancell, 2007). Allocating and managing 
risk through performance-based contracting is a critical issue. It remains unclear which factors impact 
the contractor’s willingness to bear PBC induced risks and how these risks are or should be handled in 
practice (Selviaridis & Norrman, 2014). This study is aimed at providing insights in our understanding of 
risks handling under a regime of performance based contracting. 
 
In their 2014 study Selviaridis & Norrman took a service providers perspective on the risk attitudes 
towards performance-based contracting. The customer’s perspective remains underexposed in this 
study. Maull (2012) advises to take the customers’ perspective in future supply chain research. He 
identifies two possible benefits of this research: it can improve our understanding of operations by 
looking at different ways of organizing “customer operations” than those of the organization and 
improve our traditional context of operations. This study takes both perspectives into account; the 
customer’s and the service provider’s. Having a better understanding of factors influencing the customer 
and service provider on PBC induced risks could potentially improve performance outcomes,  
relationship between the customer and service providers and contracts. 
 
Based on the preceding, the problem statement of this study is: 
 
What factors influence the service provider’s willingness to take PBC-induced risks and how are these 
risks managed in a service supply chain? 
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A service supply chain consists of the whole of management of information, processes, capacity, service 
performance and funds from the earliest supplier to the ultimate customer (Ellram et al., 2004). 
 
1.2 Research method 
 
The case studied is about the relationships between a customer and a service provider. The aim is to 
develop in-depth understanding and build a theory (Voss, Tsikriktsis, & Frohlich, 2002) regarding the risk 
attitudes and handing in performance-based contracting. 
 
A single case design (Yin, 2003) is adopted and deemed appropriate as the case is both an extreme and 
revelatory case (Yin, 2003). As the service provider and the customer are considered a unit of analysis, 
the appropriate classification according Yin (2003, p.38 -42) is embedded single case design. In 
paragraph 3.1. the choice for this embedded single case design as the appropriate research method is 
discussed and substantiated. 
 
The case study will be held at the Joint Program Office (JPO) of the F-35 Lightning II. The JPO acts as the 
customer on behave of all the F-35 Lightning II partners: the US services (US Navy, US Marine Corps and 
US Air force), the partner countries (United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Denmark, 
Norway and Australia) and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customers. The service providers is Pratt & 
Whitney (P&W). The P&W F135 engine powers the F-35. P&W has numerous subcontractors, Rolls- 
Royce and UTAS being the most important ones. 
 
Data is collected through semi-structured interviews and review of organizational documents. Semi- 
structured interviews with the service provider and customer are conducted and traverse several 
positions in both organizations (e.g. the Integrated Program Teams (IPT) Propulsion, procurement 
officers, legal and contract officers). The open-ended designed questions allows interviewees to develop 
their own views (Denscombe, 2014) on PBC and its risk allocation implications. All interviews are 
recorded and transcribed to maintain a chain of evidence. A qualitative research program called NVivo is 
used as a research database to maintain the chain of evidence and to support the coding and pattern 
matching process. 
 
The thesis is structured as follows: chapter 2 reviews the existing literature, chapter 3 discusses the 
research method, chapter 4 presents the case results and analysis and in chapter 5 the thesis concludes 
with the conclusion, discussion and by pointing out the managerial implications as well as future 
research opportunities. 
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2 Literature review 
 
In this chapter the existing literature on the main aspects of the problem statement are reviewed: risk in 
combination with performance-based contracting, service supply chain and the principal-agent model. 
The literature was found through database search using mainly Google Scholar. The following keywords 
were used, separately or in combination: “risk”, “risk management”, “risk mitigation”, “performance- 
based contracting”, “service supply chain”, “customer perspective” and “principle agent theory”. 
 
This chapter is structured as followed. It starts with the broadest topics: the service supply chain, 
followed by risk in the service supply chain. Paragraph 2.3 describes the literature on PBC and is 
followed by the paragraphs on risk induced by PBC and the handling of risk in PBC. In paragraph 2.6 the 
relevant literature on the Principle Agency Theory will be addressed. This chapter is concluded with 
paragraph 2.7 on the service provider’s willingness to bear risk under PBC. 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Service supply chains 
 
In the beginning of this century it was noted that the traditional view of (manufacturing-oriented) supply 
chain management is not entirely applicable for service supply chains (SSC) (Kathawala & Abdou, 2003; 
Sampson, 2000; Sampson & Spring, 2012b). A new framework for the SSC was developed by among 
others Ellram et al. (2004) and Baltacioglu, Ada, Kaplan, Yurt And, and Cem Kaplan (2007). The latter in 
the healthcare industry. Baltacioglu et al. (2007) defined a SSC: “as the network of suppliers, service 
providers, consumers and other supporting units that performs the functions of transaction of resources 
required to produce services; transformation of these resources into supporting and core services; and  
the delivery of these services to customers”. This is the definition adopted in this research. 
 
The customer and the interface with the customer is a key characteristic of a service (Maull, 2012) and 
could be a source of uncertainty (Erkoyuncu, Roy, Shehab, & Cheruvu, 2011). The importance of the 
customer in SSC is enhanced due to the fact that customers themselves have a vital role to play in 
creating the service outcomes (Bitner, Faranda, Hubbert, & Zeithaml, 1997). Sampson (2000) noticed 
that in SSCs the customer is one of the primary suppliers of process inputs. He named this the 
“customer-supplier duality”. The duality refers to the bidirectional nature of the SSC; the production 
flows in both directions (Sampson,2000 and Sampson & Froehle, 2006). In 2006 Sampson and Froehle 
(2006) introduced the Unified Service Theory (UST), which posits that the fundamental distinguishing 
characteristic of “services” is that they possess bidirectional supply chain relationships wherein 
customers are also suppliers. Sampson and Spring (2012a) also showed that the customer has an 
important role in the SSC and that this role covers different characters, amongst others: the supplier, 
design engineer, production manager, quality assurance manager and competitor. Service performance 
management can be considered as the key function in the SSC. The customer also has an important role 
in the specification of the expected performance (Oflaç, Sullivan, & Baltacioğlu, 2012). Because of the 
nature of service businesses, the service production process requires both customer and producer to be 
present (Baltacioglu et al., 2007). In the service supply chain (not a service triad) the service provider is 
the link between the customer and the subcontractor(s). In this position, the service provider plays a 
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vital role in the flow of communication in the SSC (Kleemann & Essig, 2013): insufficient information for 
the subcontractor could lead to uncertainty, which could lead to risk premiums. 
 
Kim et al. (2007) where among the first to study the use of PBC in a SSC. They analyzed two practically 
important issues of contracting in SSC’s: the performance requirement allocation and risk sharing. Later, 
the use of PBC in a SSC received more and more attention in scientific papers. In 2010 Randall et al. 
(2010) addressed how partners in the SSC can be aligned by PBC. Guajardo, Cohen, Kim, and Netessine 
(2011) established that PBC in SSC improves product reliability. 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Risk in (Service) Supply Chain 
 
There are many definitions of risk in literature. March and Shapira (1987) described risk as the reflecting 
variation in the distribution of possible outcomes, their likelihoods, and their subjective values. Many 
definitions contain elements as “uncertainty”, “outcome” and or “possibility”. In this research the 
definition of risk from Sitkin and Pablo (1992) will be used: “Risk is the extent to which there is 
uncertainty about whether potentially significant and/or disappointing outcomes of decisions will be 
realized.” 
 
Risk has been examined from the perspective of organizational buyer behaviors, procurement and 
supply, and purchasing strategy selection (Harland, Brenchley, & Walker, 2003). Harland et al. (2003) 
concluded that the risk increases as supply network complexity increases. 
 
Risk can be classified by type. In literature more than a few different classifications are found. Das and 
Teng (1998) distinct two equally important types of risk in a strategic alliance: performance risk and 
relational risk. Where performance risk includes R&D risk, international risk, commercial risk, and 
corporate risk. Relational risk is concerned with cooperative relationships or the probability that the 
partner does not comply with the spirit of cooperation. Later Nielsen (2007) and Meschi and Riccio 
(2008) added Country risk to the two risks identified by Das and Teng. This risk involves public 
institutions and policies created by governments as a framework for economic, legal and social relations. 
Gruneberg et al. (2007) took a different approach and asked his respondents to describe risks they 
associated with PBC. The most frequent replies involved the risk associated with fitness for purpose and 
associated insurance issues, costs rising above budget, measurement (performance and indicators), 
specification of performance and contractual issues. Omizzolo Lazzarotto, Borchardt, Pereira, and 
Almeida (2014) classified the risks associated with outsourcing into three groups: operational risks 
(related to decreases in the quality, cost, or speed of process execution), strategic risks (such as the 
protection of intellectual assets, security) and privacy problems and composite risks (related to long- 
term risks such as the loss of proficiency in the performance of the outsourced processes in the future 
due to lack of knowledge). Norrman and Lindroth (2004) classified risk into five groups: strategic risk  
(the risk of plans failing or succeeding), financial risk (the risk of financial control failing or succeeding), 
operational risk (the risk of human error of achievement), commercial risk (the risk of relationships 
failing or succeeding) and technical risk (the risk of physical assets failing/being damaged or enhanced). 
Spekman and Davis (2004) identify six areas of supply chain-related risks. These six risk areas are: the 
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physical movement of goods, flow of information, flow of money, security of a firm’s internal 
information systems, relationships forged among supply chain partners and the supply chain members’ 
reputation and image. 
 
Kleindorfer and Sertel (1979) identify three risk factors that are inputs for their risk management tool 
they titled the Real Option Framework. Expanding on Kleindorfer and Sertel (1979) contributions Cohen 
and Kunreuther (2007) presented a framework (see figure 1) for SSC contracts with emphasis on 
alignment of pricing, performance and risk management. In this research this model is used as it is fitting 
for this research and used in an After-Sales SSC situation similar to our research study. This in contrary  
to the classifications mentioned earlier in this paragraph where the context of the research involved 
strategic alliances and outsourcing. The three risk factors that are inputs for their risk management tool 
are the SSC hierarchies, the customer supplier relationship and the markets mechanisms. SSC  
hierarchies deals on the whole of the relationships between product structure, geography and customer 
priorities. Customer supplier relationship is an important risk factor as most (service) supply chain are 
not owned and operated by a single entity. This relationship determines the incentive/reward structure 
associated service support. Markets mechanisms refers to the risks derived from sourcing, purchasing 
strategies including collaborative forecasting, spot and long term contracts and auctions (Cohen & 
Kunreuther, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Supply Chain Risk Management Framework (Cohen & Kunreuther, 2007) 
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Risk management in (service) supply chain 
 
With the complex SSC nowadays interdependencies cannot be avoided and interdependencies carries 
risk. Hence risk cannot be avoided, but it can be managed. Cohen and Kunreuther (2007) recognized 
that risk management is of fundamental importance. Since the beginning of this millennium the number 
articles on supply chain risk management increased considerably (Vanany, Zailani, & Pujawan, 2009). In 
this research the supply chain risk management (SCRM) definition of Carter and Rogers (2008) is used: 
SCRM is the ability of a firm to understand and manage its economic, environmental, and social risks in 
the supply chain. 
 
Cohen and Kunreuther (2007) describe several SCRM mechanisms using the SCRM framework (figure 1). 
As stated before, the relationship between the customer and supplier determines the incentive/reward 
structure of the service support. These incentives are commonly formalized in contracts with associated 
risk mitigation mechanisms as there are revenue sharing, material buy-backs and performance based 
logistics (Cohen & Kunreuther, 2007). Developing the correct incentives is especially important to assure 
the right level of investments in highly interdependent system where underinvestment by SSC partners 
is likely to occur (Cohen & Kunreuther, 2007). 
 
Cohen and Kunreuther (2007) specify several SCRM mechanism for the risk factor Market Mechanisms. 
They propose a mix of sourcing and purchasing strategies, including spot and long term contracts to 
mitigate this risk factor. 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Performance-based contracting 
 
Performance-based contracting can be described as a contractual approach of tying the service 
provider’s payment to specified performance, rather than merely paying for its activities and tasks (Kim 
et al., 2007). Although PBC has received a lot of attention the last decade, it is not a new phenomenon. 
As far back as the 60’s initiatives were taken with academic publications focusing on how the customer 
could incentivize the supplier to provide good performance (Anderson, 1969; Hiller, 1978; Marcus, 
1964). In 1972, Levitt stated that: ‘‘the customer really doesn’t want a drilling machine, he wants a hole- 
in-the-wall’’. He acknowledged that the customer sometimes really doesn’t want a product, but a 
service or an outcome (Levitt, 1972). An often mentioned example of PBC in practice is the Roll Royce’s 
Power-by-the-Hour™ business model where the company is paid for engine availability (flight hours) 
rather than based on the cost of labor and spare parts (Neely, 2009; I. C. L. Ng, Maull, & Yip, 2009; 
Selviaridis & Wynstra, 2014; Voss et al., 2002). The aim of PBC is to align the customer’s and the service 
provider’s objectives, and have shown to provide huge cost efficiencies for the customer (I. C. L. Ng et 
al., 2009). Performance-based contracts transfer financial risks to suppliers (Selviaridis & Norrman, 
2014) and can lead to improved service and reduced costs (Kim et al., 2007). The incentives in contracts 
are considered as mechanisms that produce compliance with performance measures (Datta & Roy, 
2013). 
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Selviaridis and Wynstra (2014) present a model with the dimensions associated with PBC. This section 
will be based on that model. After a general review of the literature on PBC, the literature on PBC 
induced risks and handling of PBC induced risks (among the use of incentives) is discussed. 
 
 
Figure 2: Dimensions associated with PBC (Selviaridis & Wynstra, 2014) 
 
The last decade several attempts have been made to summarize PBC literature. A number of points of 
view can be identified: restricted to health care (Christianson, Leatherman, & Sutherland, 2008; De Vos 
et al., 2009; Mehrotra, Damberg, Sorbero, & Teleki, 2009), focused on manufacturing settings (Hypko et 
al., 2010a) or the fragmentation in PBC research (Selviaridis & Wynstra, 2014). The last 30 years over 
260 papers were published related to the field of PBC, of those 170 papers were published in the last 
decade. Performance-based contracting is just one name used for this phenomenon, other widely used 
term are amongst others: “performance contracting”, “performance-based logistics”, “outcome-based 
contracting” and “availability procurement” (Gustafsson, Ng, & Nudurupati, 2010; Hypko et al., 2010a; 
Kleemann & Essig, 2013; Kumar, Nowicki, Ramírez-Márquez, & Verma, 2007; Sang-Hyun Kim, 2007). 
These papers span several academic disciplines. The vast majority were in the field of health care, 
followed by social welfare services, defense, facilities services/maintenance and utilities/energy 
(Selviaridis & Wynstra, 2014). 
 
Beside the variety of academic disciplines in the PBC literature, various authors have researched and 
published different aspects of PBC. Randall et al. (2010) linked PBC with the service-dominant logic. 
Some authors (Kim et al., 2007; Plambeck & Zenios, 2000) studied the pricing mechanisms. Berkowitz, 
Gupta, Simpson, and McWilliams (2005) identified drivers of PBC, others contributions have focused on 
manufacturing (Hypko et al., 2010a) and the defense sector (Gustafsson et al., 2010). Selviaridis and 
Wynstra (2014) are one of the latest authors to review the PBC literature and provide recommendations 
for future research. They recommend further research to expand both PBC’s empirical focus and 
theoretical frame to develop a refined understanding of PBC design and management. In this line they 
recommend future empirically PBC research on the factors influencing the service provider’s willingness 
to bear the increased risk that PBC entails. 
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As we have seen earlier there have been numerous papers published on PBC (Beggs, Ertel, & Jones, 
2005), however only a few of these papers are on PBC’s prevalence in practice (Kumar et al., 2007; 
Randall, Nowicki, & Hawkins, 2011; Selviaridis, 2011). There is still much unknown about the concept of 
PBC. In addition, there is still no coherent understanding of PBC (Beggs et al., 2005; Berkowitz et al., 
2005; Hypko et al., 2010a; S.-H. Kim, Cohen, & Netessine, 2011; Kotlanger & Giuntini, 2008). 
 
One other underexposed area in PBC literature is the relation between the service provider and the 
subcontractors (Kleemann & Essig, 2013). Service providers strongly depend on subcontractors as PBC 
contracts usually extend beyond the service providers own capabilities (Kleemann & Essig, 2013). This 
dependence covers a significant portion of service provider’s performance (I. C. Ng, Nudurupati, & 
Tasker, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Risks induced by performance-based contracting 
 
PBC’s alter the allocation and degree of financial risks and operational risks between the service  
provider and the customer in the SSC (Doerr, Eaton, & Lewis, 2004; Ekström & Selviaridis, 2014; 
Selviaridis & Norrman, 2015). For most service providers the main concern in PBC is the financial risk 
(Gardner, 2008). For the customer, besides the financial risk there is also the operational risk of not 
being able to produce the desired effects (in this case delivering Airpower) (Doerr et al., 2004; Ekström & 
Selviaridis, 2014). 
 
The risks induced by PBC are linked to the type of contract between the customer and the service 
provider. Kim et al. (2007) studied which contracts (Cost-plus, Fixed Price or PBC) provided the best 
results depending on the stance toward risk of the SSC members, using a principal-agent model. They 
distinguish five different PBC contracts, see figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Continuum of Performance Based Contracts (Glas, Hofmann, & Eßig, 2013) 
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The amount of risk is gradually transferred from the customer to the service provider (Gruneberg et al., 
2007). Beginning on the left with the Cost-plus contract where the customer covers the risk to the right 
where the service provider covers most of the risk in the (Firm) Fixed Price or “Full PBL” contract. 
Between these two extremes, there are several “Partial PBC“ contract possibilities, each containing 
more constituents of Full PBL moving from the left to the right. The most commonly “Partial PBC“ 
contracts used are: Cost-plus Incentive Fee (CPIF), Cost-plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) and Fixed Price Incentive 
(FPI) (Berends, 2000; Glas et al., 2013; Roels, Karmarkar, & Carr, 2010; Sols, Nowick, & Verma, 2007). 
Based on above it is proposed: 
 
P1: In PBC the financial risks are (to a large extent) transferred to the service provider, while the 
operational risks remain the customer’s responsibility. 
 
Kim et al. (2007) and DoD ((DAU), 2005b) share the view that PBL strategies will generally have a phased 
contracting approach, initiated by Cost-plus cost reimbursement contracts then to Cost-plus incentive 
fee contracts and to Fixed Price incentive contracts, over time. One of the motives to move away from 
the traditional sustainment contracts is the inherent inefficiencies and tension between customer and 
service provider by linking the service provider’s profit to the amount of post-production support 
services they sell. The more parts breakdown, the more service or parts the service provider is able to 
sell. This return on sales model demonstrates a negativity associated with a transactional arrangement 
where the majority of the risk is absorbed by the customer (Sols et al., 2007). The customer ends up 
bearing the financial burden associated with the uncertainties in reliability. 
 
Gruneberg et al. (2007) add a caveat to the shift of risk from the customer to the service provider in 
PBC. And state that it may be a somewhat naïve view, especially when public sector projects are 
considered. Gruneberg et al. (2007) give the following example: “transferring to the private sector the 
performance risk associated with, say, a prison, may increase the contractor’s risk, but if the contractor 
fails to perform, the public sector client still has to provide a prison: closure due to failure of a 
commercial consideration is not an option as the public service would still need to be maintained. 
Therefore, there is not a finite amount of risk being shared around, but risk to contractors may be 
arbitrarily increased.” This example in the building sector can also be applied to the DoD. The DoD is 
responsible for national security and needs serviceable aircraft to enforce that responsibility. When in 
PBC a service provider fails to provide serviceable aircraft, the DoD is at risk of not being able to 
safeguard the national security. 
 
 
 
 
2.5 The handling of risks in case of performance-based contracting 
 
Risk management in PBC is about risk identification and allocation (Gruneberg et al., 2007) and 
sequentially involves developing strategies for reducing the probabilities of negative events and/or their 
consequences should they occur (Cohen & Kunreuther, 2007). According to Gruneberg et al. (2007) no 
papers have been published on the real-world implications of how PBC changes risk. However, the risk 
implications of transferring risk from the public to the private sector has been studied. According to 
Datta and Roy (2011) incentives are normally used in industrial service contracts to transfer risks and to 
 measure compliance with performance measures. Furthermore, Prendergast (2000) considered the 
tradeoff of risk and incentives a central principle of agency theory. Cohen and Kunreuther (2007) state 
that in risk management providing incentives plays an important role to assure an appropriate levels of 
investment. This is in line with Gruneberg et al. (2007) who states: “As the rewards of Performance- 
based contracting payment are delayed and repeat business may not materialize, taking on the 
additional risks of PBC could jeopardize the solvency of the contractors involved. Therefore, the question 
becomes one of balancing the increased risks against the possibility of increased rewards”. 
 
The type of contract between the customer and the service provider affects the incentives, 
responsibilities and risks allocation for both. Kim et al. (2007) state that in a fixed-price contract all the 
risk is shifted on to the service provider and in this way offers little motivation to improve performance. 
A cost-plus contract shares the risks between customer and service provider but provides few or no 
incentives for the service provider to reduce cost. When cost uncertainty is high Kim et al. (2007) 
suggest performance incentives should be low. In line with this cost-sharing is generally more useful 
when cost uncertainty is high, this is usually at the beginning of the product life cycle (Datta & Roy, 
2013). 
 
Datta and Roy (2013) introduced Target Price Performance Incentive (TPPI) type contracts. These type of 
contracts link technical maintenance data and individual prices on specific equipment (e.g. repairs and 
spares) with an incentivized gain share which rewards the parties in accordance with the effort they 
have put into achieve savings through reliability improvements or servicing periodicity changes. This is 
specified up to equipment level. This way both parties share in disproportionate profits or losses 
(Erkoyuncu et al., 2011). Brown and Burke (2000) studied the risk management of performance based 
rates. They concluded that accurate historical data records are critical to effectively manage 
performance risks. 
 
In PBC both parties, the service provider and the customer, assume a certain amount of risk that is 
different in nature for each. For most service providers the biggest concern is financial risk; providers 
want to ensure that the customer will give them enough business to allow them to realize adequate  
(and ideally profitable) return on their investments. One of the best ways for service providers to ensure 
profitability and reduce financial risk is to secure longer contracts. They must also carefully weigh their 
(operational) risks in determining the level of service they are willing/able to provide (Gardner, 2008). 
Brown and Burke (2000) have developed a method to effectively manage the PBC induced financial risk 
by using different scenarios to establish fair performance rates. 
 
As stated before PBC can realize customer outcomes by aligning incentives among supply chain actors 
(Randall et al., 2010; Tarakci, Tang, Moskowitz, & Plante, 2006). Berends (2000) studied the use of 
incentives. He noted that in order to be effective, the incentives must be aligned to the overall project 
objectives, and not just the risk involved. Moreover, incentives should be attractive to the contractor 
over the entire contract duration to present the desired performance. According to Datta and Roy 
(2013) the design of incentive mechanisms depends upon the type of inter-organizational governance 
approach used for managing buyer–supplier relationships. Factors inﬂuencing incentive design for 
government contracts are: develop services (quality & quantity), minimize costs and minimize budget 
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 uncertainty (Hooper, 2008). Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) studied the alignment of incentives. 
They noticed that aligning incentives generally involved four issues: the allocation of compensation 
between base and variable, the design of variable pay forms of compensation, the setting of 
performance targets for the awarding of variable pay and the selection of measures used in evaluating 
performance. 
 
Based on the above, it is proposed: 
 
P2: In PBC, risk is transferred from the customer to the service provider, in return the customer 
incentivizes the performance of the service provider and in doing so balances the risk with the incentive. 
 
 
 
 
2.6 Principal-agency theory 
 
The principal-agency theory is a method for analyzing problems where one party (the principal) 
delegates work to another party (the agent) to perform a certain task (Eisenhardt, 1989). When the 
principal contracts an agent to perform a service on his behalf (and delegates some decision making 
authority to the agent in the process) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the principal allows the agent’s actions 
to directly affect his own well-being (Toivonen & Toivonen, 2014). 
 
According to Eisenhardt (1989) the principal-agent model is used to address two problems that can 
occur in agency relationship. The first is the agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or goals of 
the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the 
agent is actually doing. The principal cannot verify that the agent behaves appropriately (or 
opportunistically). The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent 
have different attitudes toward risk. The problem is that the principal and the agent may prefer  
different actions because of the different risk preferences. Eisenhardt (1989) states the Agency theory is 
most relevant in situations where contracting problems are difficult. She names three examples: when 
there is (1) a goal conflict between principals and agents so that agent opportunism is likely, (2)  
outcome uncertainty to trigger the risk implications of the theory, and (3) when there are team-oriented 
jobs in which evaluation of behaviors is difficult. On the first example Eisenhardt (1989) studied the goal 
misalignment in relation to outcome based contracts. She concluded that with an outcome based 
contract the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal. For the customer this would 
reduce the risk of opportunistically behavior by the service provider. Based on the above, it is proposed: 
 
P3: The more PBC constituents the contract between the service provider (agent) and the customer 
(principal) contain, the more likely the service provider will behave in the interests of the customer. 
 
Principal agency theory holds promise as theoretical foundation for analyzing the PBC-issues related to 
the relationships between actors in SSC’s. Van der Valk and Van Iwaarden (2011) and Selviaridis and 
Norrman (2014) reached the same conclusion on the bi-directional nature of the principle agent 
relationship in the SSC. Addressing the fact that the service provider acts an agent to the customer in a 
contractual point of view and as principal to the customer in case of service delivery. The customer 
needs these inputs to guarantee success. The service provider plays different roles in the principal- 
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 agency theory. The service provider acts as an agent to the customer (principal) in a contractual point of 
view, but as a principal when contracting with subcontractors. In this way the subcontractor plays an 
important part in the PBC. Van der Valk and Van Iwaarden (2011) highlight the unique role of the 
subcontractors in the SSC a triadic service relationship. In this situation subcontractors are confronted 
with two principals: the customer and the service provider. 
 
McCue and Prier (2008) state that the principal and agent do not necessary share the same levels of 
information, do not automatically have the same goals and interests and as such places the agent in a 
position to (opportunistically) take advantage of the situation. Kunz and Pfaff (2002) advocate that in 
incentivized contracts, the principal must stimulate the agent’s work effort by forcing him to bear at 
least some of the production risk. According to standard agency theory, an optimal incentive contract 
involves a pay-for-performance scheme that ties the agent’s pay-off to production indicators that 
(partially) correlate with his effort level. Robinson and Scott (2009) argue that it is therefore important 
to have an output or performance-based service contract designed, which is a critical component of the 
principal–agent theory, to induce optimal effort, or increase productivity consistent with efficient risk 
sharing. Selviaridis and Norrman (2014) extended the study of Van der Valk and Van Iwaarden (2011) on 
risk allocation in SSC. They concluded that the service provider is (most likely) in the best position to 
bear and manage PBC-induced financial risk. This because of the knowledge of the involved inputs from 
customers and sub-contractors and the potential ability of the service provider coordinate the flow of 
these inputs (Sampson & Froehle, 2006). 
 
Agent and principal risk aversion refers to the risk preferences of contracting parties. In line with what 
Kim et al. (2007) concluded, Selviaridis and Norrman (2014) state a risk-averse agent makes behavior- 
based contracts more attractive. Performance based contracts become less expensive when the agent 
has a neutral stance toward risk. When the agent is risk averse and in a uncertain environment, the 
principal can absorb more risk (Camuffo, Furlan, & Rettore, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
2.7 The willingness to bear PBC induced risk 
 
Economists use the term risk preferences to describe someone’s tolerance for risk (Wu, 2007).The risk 
preference can be stated in a degree of risk aversion. Firms or individuals who are risk averse are willing 
to give up some possible positive outcomes to avoid risk (March & Shapira, 1987). Risk preference is 
studied on numerous subjects: students, animals, individuals and organizations. When confronted with a 
risky alternative with potential good outcomes all the subjects appear to be risk averse (March & 
Shapira, 1987). When a service provider is risk averse, it might be an inhibitor of PBC (Selviaridis & 
Wynstra, 2014). In this research the willingness to bear risk is considered the preparedness to choose for 
uncertainty facing potentially significant and/or disappointing outcomes. 
 
The research papers on the willingness to bear PBC induced risk and the factors influencing this 
willingness are scant (Selviaridis & Norrman, 2014). Else (1992) studied PBC within Social Services and 
concluded that the willingness partly depends on how the performance is specified (how should the 
desired outcome be specified) and how the performance is measured (is the desired outcome 
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measurable). Baker (2000) and Doerr et al. (2004) reached the same conclusion. The most recent and 
comprehensive study on the service provider’s willingness to bear PBC-induced financial risk in SSC is 
performed by Selviaridis and Norrman (2014). They discovered four influencing factors: the ability of the 
service provider to: (1) measure and control the service performance (“attributability”), (2) balance risk 
and reward across the SSC and (3) transfer risk to subcontractors. The last influencing factor they found 
was (4) the importance of relational governance in SSC relationships. The influencing factors of 
Selviaridis and Norrman (2014) will be addressed in more detail below. 
 
1. The ability of the service provider to measure and control the service performance 
 
This factor consists of two elements: the ability to measure the service performance and the ability to 
have control over the service performance. 
 
Several papers address the issues on measuring of the service performance in PBC. They can roughly be 
divided into two groups: the ones on (the difficulties of) specifying the service performance and the  
ones on the measurability of the service performance. Doerr et al. (2004) studied PBC measurement 
issues in the defense industry. They recognized that (specifying) issues could arise in the gap between 
the customer’s objectives and the service performance measure. Hensher and Stanley (2008) also 
address the problem of specifying clear performance measures. The problem could occur when the 
customer lacks the necessary information to specify the decision-making activities. Performance 
measuring is one of the key elements in PBC according to Datta and Roy (2011). However, in many cases 
there are no well-defined performance measures for evaluating the service performance as it is based 
on the outcome as well as the process of service delivery (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, & Berry, 1985). 
According to Selviaridis and Norrman (2014) and Oflaç et al. (2012) the ability to attribute service 
performance seems to depend on the measurability of the performance. Measurability can be low when 
tasks take a long time to be completed, are jointly produced or result in soft outcomes (Selviaridis & 
Norrman, 2014). 
 
The ability of the service provider to control the service performance was studied in the transport 
industry by Fearnley, Bekken, and Norheim (2004). They reached the same conclusion as Selviaridis and 
Norrman (2014) in a case study where the service provider had limited influence on the (total) service 
performance. The ability of the service provider to control the service performance also relates to the 
degree the SSC environment can be controlled, influencing factors include the economic climate and 
technological changes (Selviaridis & Norrman, 2014). More control translates in less risk for the service 
provider. Based on above it is proposed: 
 
P4: The abler the service provider is to measure and control the service performance, the more willing 
the service provider is to bear the risks induce by PBC. 
 
2. The ability of the service provider to balance risk and reward across the SSC 
 
Paragraph 2.5 covered the incentives as an instrument to balance and mitigate risk in PBC. Selviaridis  
and Norrman (2014) state that the incentives should reflect a good balance of risk and reward for buyers 
and suppliers. Besides incentives, more than a few authors (Cohen & Kunreuther, 2007; Heinrich & Choi, 
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2007; Li, Fan, Lee, & Cheng, 2015; Towse & Garrison Jr, 2010) consider risk sharing/balancing an 
important risk mitigation mechanism in PBC. As a critical note however, Agrell, Lindroth, and Norrman 
(2004) noticed that the problem with risk sharing/balancing is that companies might place their own 
interest above the SSC’s and consequently displaying opportunistic behavior. Based on above it is 
proposed: 
 
P5: The more effective the service provider can balance risk and reward across the SSC, the more willing 
the service provider is to bear the risks induce by PBC. 
 
3. The ability of the service provider to transfer risk to subcontractors 
 
As pointed out in the paragraphs above, subcontractors play an important part in PBC in the SSC. In 
most cases the service provider is not able to deliver the service performance alone and depends on 
significant share of the performance delivery on subcontractors. Datta and Roy (2013) consider 
uncertainty sharing between the service provider and the subcontractors the basis for sustainable PBC. 
On a critical note however, Selviaridis and Norrman (2014) question the added value of the service 
provider if the risk transferred from the customer will be passed on to the subcontractors. Based on 
above it is proposed: 
 
P6: The abler the service provider is to transfer risk to subcontractors, the more willing the service 
provider is to bear the risks induce by PBC. 
 
4. The importance of relational governance in SSC relationships 
 
Selviaridis and Norrman (2014) stress the importance of relational governance and suggest providers to 
actively nurture collaboration and trust in customer and sub-contractor relationships. Relational 
governance can reduce the risk associated with low performance attributability. The importance of 
relational governance is confirmed by Lu, Guo, Qian, He, and Xu (2015). In their study they concluded 
that relational governance is important for improving project performance and mitigating opportunism. 
Zheng, Roehrich, and Lewis (2008) found evidence that contractual governance should be seen as crucial 
but not sufficient ‘qualifier’ for effective exchange and therefore needs to be complemented with pro- 
active relational governance. Based on the above, it is proposed: 
 
P7: The more focus on the relational governance between the service provider and the customer, the 
more willing the service provider is to bear the risks induce by PBC. 
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3 Research design 
 
In chapter 2, the relevant literature related to the problem statement was discussed. In the process 
seven propositions were composed. These propositions explicate our expectations and give the ability to 
focus and specify the research. They will be challenged later in this research. This chapter explains how 
the research is designed and how it was conducted. It also shows which substantiated choices were 
made. The design of the research is discussed in the first paragraph, followed by the way the data was 
collected. After the measures are discussed, it is explained how the data was analyzed. This chapter 
concludes with a paragraph on the methodological thoroughness of this research. 
 
3.1 Research design 
 
There are several research methods for empirical studies. Yin (2003) distinguishes five different research 
strategies: the experiment, the archival analysis, the history, the survey and the case study. Depending 
on the form of the research question Yin proposes two or more preferred research strategies. For 
instance, “why” questions will lead to the use of the strategy case study, history or experiment. 
However, in the instance the “what” question is exploratory any of the five strategies can be used (Yin, 
2003). The problem statement in this study is exploratory and for this study, the case study research 
design is chosen as the primary research strategy. First, it is described why the other strategies are not 
or less suitable for this research, after that it is explained why the case study is research method of 
choice. 
 
According to Yin (2003) during an experiment an investigator can manipulate behavior directly, precisely 
and systematically. Furthermore, an experiment purposefully separates a phenomenon from its contexts 
so that the attention can be focused on only a few variables. In this research the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not apparent. An attempt to separate the phenomenon from its context 
could lead to incomplete results. This makes an experiment unsuitable strategy for this research. 
 
The history and the archival analysis are limited to phenomena of the past and consequently do not 
include contemporary events. As a result, relevant informants may not be available for interview and 
relevant events may not be available for direct observation (Yin, 1981). Although PBC is not a new 
phenomenon, contemporary events need to be included for a comprehensive approach. This makes the 
history and the archival analysis unsuitable strategies for this research. 
 
The survey is a research strategy that is suitable for research question in the form of “who, what, where, 
how much or how many” (Yin, 2003). This strategy could potentially be used in this research. However, 
this strategy has its limitations. The ability to investigate the context is limited (Yin, 2003) due to the 
limited number of variables that can be analyzed in relation to the number of responders. These 
limitations can be addressed in a case study, where the contemporary phenomenon is investigated 
within its real-life context (Yin, 2003). Besides this with the case study approach the “full variety of 
evidence – documents, artifacts, interview, and observations” (Yin, 2003 p.8) can be utilized. 
 
According to Meredith (1998 p. 442-443): “the case study typically uses multiple methods and tools for 
data collection from a number of entities by a direct observer(s) in a single, natural setting that considers 
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temporal and contextual aspects of the contemporary phenomenon under study, but without 
experimental controls or manipulations”. In his paper, Meredith (1998 p. 444) also cites three strengths 
of the case study approach (Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 1987): 
 
“1. The phenomenon can be studied in its natural setting and meaningful, relevant theory generated 
from the understanding gained through observing actual practice; 
 
2. The case method allows the much more meaningful question of why, rather than just what and how, 
to be answered with a relatively full understanding of the nature and complexity of the complete 
phenomenon; and 
 
3. The case method lends itself to early, exploratory investigations where the variables are still unknown 
and the phenomenon not at all understood.” 
 
The fact that in a case study the phenomenon is studied in its natural setting and free of experimental 
controls or manipulations is likely to generate the richest data. This because no context is left out or 
altered. In this research, a case study also has the potential to give more insight, not only what factors 
influence the willingness of the service provider but also for instance why and in what way and how they 
are managed. As shown in chapter two, recently PBC is getting more and more attention. Nevertheless, 
there is still a lot unknown how the concept of PBC. According to Meredith (1998) in this situation, a  
case study is the appropriate choice. 
 
Using the case study strategy for studying the factors influencing the provider willingness to bear PBC- 
risks in an agency theory framework allows collecting data from multiple perspectives (Selviaridis & 
Norrman, 2014). 
 
The factors mentioned above make the case study strategy a justifiable choice for this research. 
 
3.1.1 Single case design 
 
Yin (2003) describes four basic types of design for case studies, based on the number of cases and the 
number of units of analysis. In this research a single case design (Yin, 2003) is used. Yin (2003) warns for 
the potential vulnerability of this design and provides several conditions for a proper use of a single case 
design. This study meets two of these conditions: it’s both an extreme and a revelatory case. 
Considering the unique financial magnitude of the program, the contract between the service provider 
and the customer can be considered an extreme case. Moreover, the contract between service provider 
and the customer are considered classified and are not accessible by researchers outside the program. 
In this perspective the case is considered revelatory. 
 
The case consists of the relationship between a major Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) (service 
providers) in the aviation industry and their customer. The units of analysis are the group of people 
directly involved in preparing, negotiating and approving the contracts between the service provider and 
the customer. The group of people from the service provider’s side is considered a unit of analysis as is 
the group of people from customer’s side. 
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3.2 Data collection 
 
3.2.1 Selected cases 
 
To answer the problem statement of this research data is required. This data is derived from the 
sustainment case of the F135 engine, the engine that powers the F-35 Lightning II. The case is selected 
based on purposive sampling (Patton, 1990) because of the information-rich character of this case 
(intensity sampling). The case is part of a large PBC project (Randall et al., 2010) and a complex supply 
chain (Fayezi, O'Loughlin, & Zutshi, 2012). The case is part of one of the biggest US military development 
and sustainment projects in history (Vucetic, 2013), with a total expected program cost of US$ 1.5  
trillion (through 2070 in then-year dollars). From the start, the project has been linked with PBC (Sols et 
al., 2007). Nevertheless, only recently the first steps have been taken to PBC contracts with the 
contractors (service providers). 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Relation between the subcontractors, service provider, customer and Units 
 
The department, or Integrated Product Team (IPT), Propulsion is part of the F-35 Lightning II Joint 
Program Office (JPO). The F-35 Lightning II Program (previously also known as the Joint Strike Fighter 
Program) is the Department of Defense's focal point for defining an affordable next generation strike 
aircraft weapon systems (D. o. Defense). The JPO is funded by the US government and the partner 
countries to develop, produce and sustain the F-35 and its engine the F135. The JPO currently employs 
about 2500 people, civilian and military, over half a dozen locations. In the case the JPO is the customer. 
The service provider is the Original Equipment Manufacturer of the F135; Pratt & Whitney, part of the 
United Technologies Company (UTC). Pratt & Whitney is one of the leading military engine producers in 
the world. 
 
For the last 18 months the IPT Propulsion of the JPO and Pratt & Whitney worked together on the 
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) plan of the FY17 contract. This is the first performance contract 
between the two parties and is considered a transition PBL contract. And can be seen as a steppingstone 
toward a full PBL contract. The PBL plan contains the Performance Work Statement (PWS) and is 
considered the working end of the FY17 contract. It describes the who, what and how on the service 
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performance. The contract has two option1 years for FY18 and 19. The contract will be signed in the fall 
of 2016 and be in affect by December 2016. It supersedes the previous contract which had a total value 
of US$ 1.9 billion, this contract covered the sustainment as well as the production for FY16 (Whitney, 
2016). 
 
3.2.2 Data sources 
 
Yin (2003) describes three principles for data collection in case studies. The first principle is to use 
multiple sources of evidence. For this Yin (2003) discusses six major sources: documentation, archival 
records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation and physical artifacts. In this research 
two sources of evidence will be used: interviews and (organizational) documentations. Yin (2003) 
considers interviews as one of the most important sources of case study information. One of the reasons 
is that case studies are about human affairs and these can only be reported and interpreted through the 
eyes of specific interviewees (Yin, 2003). Besides interviews, examined documents will provide an 
additional source of data. The (organizational) documentations consist of the supporting documents of 
the contract between the service provider and the customer. Appendix E gives an overview of the 
studied documents. These documents are an important source of data as the content of contract can be 
related and compared to the data derived from the interviews. Multiple sources of data are needed for 
data triangulation, which helps to build the construct validity (multiple sources of data provide multiple 
measures of the same phenomenon). 
 
3.2.1 Semi-structured interviews and selected interviewees 
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with customer and service provider managers. Semi- 
structured interviews are chosen as such interviews are used in cases where the interviewee has a 
complex stock of knowledge about the topic under study (Flick, 2009). This kind of interview allows the 
interviewee to share their knowledge, including assumptions, about PBC in their answers to the open 
questions of the interview guide (appendix A). While pursuing a consistent line of inquiry of the 
interview guide, the interviewee is able to answer the questions and elaborate on them allowing 
differences in views. This line interviewing is expected to produce the richest data and insight. 
 
The interview guide served two objectives: first, it gave information and guidance on the course of this 
interview. Secondly, repeating the exact same modus operandi each and every interview increased the 
reliability of this case study (Voss et al., 2002). The guide resembles a funnel model; starting with broad 
and open end question in the beginning and closed with detailed questions. The interview questions 
covered several themes such as risk allocation in PBC, contract design and willingness to bear PBC 
induced risk by the service provider. This allows the interviewee to share his knowledge and thoughts on 
these areas. A detailed description of the interview process is provided in appendix A. Appendix B shows 
the relationship between the research sources as there are the contracts and the interview questions 
and the seven propositions of this research. 
 
The interviewees were key informants; managers from the customer and service provider and spanning 
several positions all related to PBC e.g. procurement officers, contracting officers, account managers, 
 
1 
At the moment of writing this thesis the option years have yet to be negotiated. 
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business development managers and managing directors. The interviewees covered all the steps of the 
procurement process, from specification of the requirement to the final contact. These key informants 
are considered excellent sources. They were able to contribute the most to get a clear understanding of 
factors influencing the service provider’s willingness to bear PBC-induced risks. As well on the part how 
these risks are managed in a service supply chain. In total, 7 interviews were held: four with the 
customer and three with the service provider. According to Van Bruggen, Lilien, and Kacker (2002) using 
multiple informants improved the quality of the response data and there by the validity of the research 
findings. 
 
3.3 Measures 
 
This paragraph is on the taken measures and consists of two parts. The first part is on how Yin’s second 
and third principle of data collection are organized in this research. The second part is on how the 
variables in this research are defined and made in to measurable factors. 
 
3.3.1 Case study database and maintaining a chain of evidence 
 
Yin’s second and third principle of data collection in case studies are respectively creating a case study 
database and maintaining a chain of evidence. The quantitative research program NVivo was used to 
organize, code and store all the research data. NVivo also supported in the pattern matching and 
analyze process. NVivo stores the interview recording, transcripts and coded material. The 
organizational documents were not loaded into NVivo due to safety consideration. The NVivo database 
will be accessible to the supervisors for reviewing the evidence. Utilizing a database that is accessible to 
others increases the reliability of the case study (Yin, 2003). Maintaining a chain of evidence also 
increases the reliability of the case study. Besides organizing, storing and analyzing the data maintaining 
a chain of evidence is the second purpose of the NVivo database. 
 
3.3.2 Operationalization 
 
Operationalization is the process of accurately define variables into measurable factors. The process 
defines fuzzy concepts and allows them to be measured, empirically and quantitatively (Shuttleworth, 
2008). Appendix C shows all the elements of the 7 proposition and their relations. 
21  
This model is abridged to the conceptual model of this research below (figure 5). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Conceptual model of the research 
 
The model consists of five concepts, all need to be defined and made in to measurable factors. The five 
concepts are: the willingness to bear PBC induced risks, measure and control the service output, balance 
risk and award across the SSC, transfer risk to the subcontractors and relational governance. 
Unfortunately, these concepts are not well defined in literature. Table 1 gives an overview of the 
operationalization of the concepts. 
 
Willingness to bear PBC induced risks 
 
In this research the willingness to accept PBC induced risks is defined as the extent the service provider 
will agree and accept the PBC constituents in the contract between the customer and the service 
provider. Two dimensions can be identified in this definition: PBC constituents in the contract and the 
service provider commitment to the PBC constituents. For these dimensions two indicators have been 
selected. 
 
Measure and control the service output 
 
In this research measure and control the service output is defined as the extent the service provider can 
measure, control and influence the service performance. Selviaridis and Norrman (2014) recognized two 
dimensions regarding measuring and controlling the service (performance) output. The first is the 
measurability of the service (performance) output. This was discussed in chapter 2. Defined metrics in 
the contracts are an indicator of this dimension. The other dimension is the service provider (lack of) 
control over input and behavior of the customer and the subcontractors. In other words, the 
attributability of the service provider to the service (performance) output. Indicators are exclusions on 
the performance metric. This indicates the service provider cannot hold accountable for a certain event 
and indicates low attributability. 
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Balance risk and award across the SSC 
 
In this research balancing the risk and awards across the SSC is defined as the extent the service 
provider and customer have the ability to balance risks and awards the SSC, including subcontractors. 
Selviaridis and Norrman (2014) recognized two dimensions regarding balancing the risk and awards 
across the SSC. The first is the view of the customer on the performance based incentives. The customer 
can be (too) price focused and not be willing to pay performance bonuses or risk premium. Indicators 
are incentives and risk premium in contract. The second is the extent the service provider shares risk 
and reward with subcontractors. An indicator is PBC constituents in contract with the subcontractor. 
 
Transfer risk to the subcontractors 
 
In this research the transfer of risk to the subcontractors is defined as the extent the (financial) risks are 
transferred from the customer to the service provider and on to the subcontractors. Selviaridis and 
Norrman (2014) recognized two dimensions regarding the transfer of risk to the subcontractors. The 
first is perceived (lack of) influence of subcontractor on end customer performance. The second 
dimension is the subcontractor (lack of) reward for risk-taking. An indicator is PBC constituents in 
contract with the subcontractor. 
 
Relational governance 
 
In this research Relational governance definition of Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) is used:  Relational 
governance is the interfirm exchanges that include significant relationship specific assets, combined with 
a high level of inter-organizational trust (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Selviaridis and Norrman (2014) 
recognized two dimensions regarding the role of relational governance. The first is the extent of 
collaboration, trust and flexibility in between the customer and the service provider. Indicators are the 
expressed amount of trust, the level of collaboration and flexibility. The second dimension is the extent 
of control that is given to the service provider and subcontractors. 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical concept Operational definition Dimensions 
Willingness to bear PBC 
induced risks 
The extent the service provider will 
agree on and accept the PBC 
constituents in the contract. 
PBC constituents in the contract (PBL 
plan) 
Measure and control the 
service output 
The extent the service provider can 
measure, control and influence the 
service performance. 
Measurability of performance in the 
service supply chain 
Service provider (lack of) control over 
input and behavior of the customer 
and the subcontractors. 
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Balance risk and award 
across the SSC 
The service provider and customer have 
the ability the balance risks and awards 
the SSC, including subcontractors. 
Customer views on performance- 
based incentives 
Service provider risk and reward 
sharing with subcontractors. PBC 
constituents in the contract (PBL plan) 
Transfer risk to the 
subcontractors 
The (financial) risks in PBC is transferred 
from the customer to service provider 
and on to the subcontractor(s). 
Subcontractor perceived (lack of) 
influence on end customer 
performance and financial exposure in 
connection to PBC 
(Lack of) subcontractor reward for risk- 
taking. PBC constituents in the 
contract (PBL plan) 
Relational governance The interfirm exchanges that include 
significant relationship specific assets, 
combined with a high level of inter- 
organizational trust (Zaheer & 
Venkatraman, 1995). 
Extent of collaboration, trust and 
flexibility in customer relations 
Extent of control that is given to the 
service provider and subcontractors 
 
Table 1: Operationalization of the conceptual model 
 
3.4 Data analysis 
 
After the data was collected through interviews and studying the documents, several methods were 
used to process the data. The used methods include coding, pattern matching and within case analyses. 
 
Coding in NVivo 
 
Coding is used as a measure of data reduction to make the analysis of the large amount of data more 
efficient. It is used as a labeling and indexing mechanism to link related data. Codes is assigned to 
written out interview data and documents. Three kinds of coding were used (Hahn, 2008): open coding, 
focused coding and thematic coding. A qualitative data analysis software program called NVivo, is used 
for the coding process. NVivo allows you to code several data sources. In this case the data sources 
loaded in to NVivo consisted of all the transcribed interviews in MS Word format. NVivo allows you to 
add codes (create nodes as it is called in NVivo) before, during and after processing the data. Afterwards 
all the coded material is presented is one clear overview, allowing better and easier pattern matching. 
NVivo is also used as the database to store all the used data: recordings, transcripts, articles, etc. and to 
maintain a chain of evidence. Because of security reasons the used organizational documents were not 
uploaded to NVivo. 
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Pattern matching 
 
The coded data was processed using pattern matching. According to Almutairi, Gardner, and McCarthy 
(2014) pattern matching techniques can be used to reconcile the multiple perspectives of knowledge in 
case-study research. If the pattern of the findings matches the pattern of propositions, the finding 
supports the proposition and the theory is confirmed. If pattern of the findings does not match the 
pattern of proposition, an alternative explanation has to be find. This could result in new propositions. 
Pattern matching will help to insure the internal validity of this research (Yin, 2003). NVivo presens the 
coded data in one clear overview per code, helping the pattern matching process. 
 
Case analysis 
 
We’ve applied within-case analysis. According to Eisenhardt (1989, p.533): “within-case analysis gains 
familiarity with data and preliminary theory generation”. Within-case analysis is applied within the unit 
of analysis, between the unit of analysis and between the unit of analysis and the documents. The 
within-case analysis is performed simultaneous to the coding and pattern matching process. All the 
interviews are fully transcribed and coded in NVivo. During the interviews and after transcription 
attempts were made to recognize patterns between the different interviewees and organizational 
documents. The propositions are compared to the data derives from the interviews and organizational 
documents. 
 
 
 
 
3.5 Methodological issues 
 
To insure methodological thoroughness four quality criteria are evaluated: construct validity, internal 
validity, external validity and reliability. 
 
Construct validity 
 
Construct validity deals with identifying the right operational measures for the concepts that are being 
studied (Yin, 2003). Several measures will be taken to insure the construct validity of this research. One 
measure is using multiple sources of evidence. Several persons per unit of analysis were interviewed. 
Huber and Power (1985) conclude that interviewing more than one person per unit of analysis increases 
the level of understanding of that unit by offsetting the biases or by reducing errors through reconciling 
responses. Moreover, data triangulation is applied, entailing of data from interviews and data from 
organizational documents. An additional applied measure is maintaining the chain of evidence, from 
source to report. NVivo is used to maintain this chain of evidence from recordings, to transcripts to 
codes. The final measure to insure the construct validity is to verify the operational measures by the 
supervisor of the Open University before the research commenced (Flick, 2009). 
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Internal validity 
 
Internal validity deals with “establishing casual relationships where certain conditions are believed to 
lead to other relationships than spurious relationships” (Yin, 2003 p.34). Several measures were taken to 
insure the internal validity of this research. First and utmost pattern-matching was applied. In this case, 
empirical based patterns from the derived research data are compared with the propositions. These 
propositions are based on literature and established concepts as service supply chain management, PBC 
and the agency theory (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008). The data was displayed in NVivo code 
overviews in a way that the data could be examined for cross-analysis (Yin, 2003). 
 
External validity 
 
External Validity deals with identifying how the domain (the findings of the case study) can be 
generalized (Yin, 2003). This research was well documented using NVivo as a source of reference. The 
readers are able to reproduce the research or use the findings in other fields of research. 
 
Reliability 
 
Reliability deals with how the findings can be replicated in other studies and to minimize errors and 
biases (Yin, 2003). Several measures were taken to insure the reliability of this research. One measure is 
using the case study database in NVivo, which will include interview recordings, transcripts, quotations, 
codes, memos. Another measure to insure the reliability is the development and use of the interview 
guide (appendix A) (Voss et al., 2002). 
 
Considerations 
 
The environment in which the data was gathered is sensitive. In the interviews, the opinion of the 
interviewee may not always reflect company policy. Most information in the documents is proprietary. 
The information used in the study needs to sanitized to make sure no classified information comes 
available. Data anonymization will be applied to make sure that confidentiality will be maintained at all 
times, and identification of participants will not be available during or after the study. 
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4 Research results 
 
In the previous chapter, the research design was discussed as well as the way the research was 
conducted. On top of that, the research choices were substantiated. In this chapter, the research results 
will be discussed. Earlier, we focused on the problem statement by composing seven propositions. 
These propositions are challenged in this chapter. In the first paragraph, the researched case is 
described in more detail. In paragraph 4.2 the results of the data analysis derived from the documents 
and interviews are presented. This chapter is concluded with a paragraph on the evaluation of the 
propositions and a summery. In chapter 5, these findings will be discussed, the conclusions are drawn 
and recommendations are offered. 
 
 
 
 
4.1 The case 
 
The researched case is of the sustainment of the propulsion system of the F-35 Lightning II: Pratt & 
Whitney’s F135. It is currently the most powerful military jet engine in the world (Company, 2016).  
There are two types of F135 engine for the F-35: the F135-PW-100 for the Conventional Takeoff and 
Landing (CTOL) and Carrier-Suitable Variant (CV) variants and the F135-PW-600 for the Short Takeoff  
and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant. Both engine types will be under one performance contract for 
FY17. In this case, the F-35 Lightning II Joint Program Office (JPO) is the customer and Pratt & Whitney 
the service provider. The Performance Based Logistics (PBL) plan for this contract is finalized. The PBL 
plan contains the Performance Work Statement (PWS) and is considered the working end of the FY17 
contract. It describes amongst other, the roles and responsibilities of the customer and service provider, 
the performance that is requested, incentivized and the way it is monitored. So essentially it describes 
the who, what and how on the service performance. It’s important to note that this PBL plan, including 
the PWS, is a product of the cooperation between the customer and service provider. Both parties 
worked together preparing this PBL plan, insuring it is acceptable for both and affordable when 
executed. In other cases, the customer might dictate the conditions in total isolation. That is not the  
case in this instance. The scope of the performance, described in the PWS, is a product of the interaction 
between the customer and the service provider. It is this process of getting to this PBL plan that created 
the necessary insight and knowledge for this case study. To insure an execution date on December 1st 
2016, the final price will be negotiated in the fall of 2016. The previous contracts had a total value of  
US$ 1.9 billion for the production and sustainment of the F135 engines in FY16 (Whitney, 2016). 
 
The F135 is in the final stage of the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase, where the 
capabilities of the system are verified and enhanced. Concurrently the system is in so-called low‑rate 
initial production (LRIP) where the engines are produced in relative small numbers until the SDD phase is 
completed. As the system matures over time, the contracting approach will shift from cost-plus 
incentive/award/fixed fee from the start of the program to a (partly) fixed-price incentive type contract 
later on (U. S. D. o. Defense, 2015). Also see figure 3 for the continuum of Performance Based Contracts. 
In traditional transactional arrangements, the customer would purchase all logistics elements to sustain 
the engine as there are support equipment, tooling, manuals, spare parts e.g.. Pratt & Whitney as the 
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service provider would provide parts and services on a transactional basis. In this case the arrangement 
is on a Cost-plus basis. According to the DoD, Cost-plus contracts do not translate in “best value” for the 
customer (Ewer, 2015). The F-35 program is therefore selected as to have a PBC sustainment strategy 
(Randall et al., 2010). Ultimately, the customer wants to have a full PBL contract with the service 
provider (MOU, 2006). This FY17 contract is considered a transitional or pilot PBC contract based on 
Cost-plus Incentive Fee. 
 
Pratt & Whitney is familiar with PBC. Besides its experience with commercial dollar-per-flight-hour 
arrangements, the F135 itself is derived from the F119-PW-100 engine, which powers the F-22 Raptor. 
The US Air force has a PBC arrangement with Pratt & Whitney to sustain this engine.  The JPO aims to 
have a similar contract with Pratt & Whitney. Here the JPO and PW will team up to provide long-term 
life-cycle and depot support. (Flynn, 2005). For unit level engine maintenance, Pratt & Whitney does not 
provide the facilities, labor and infrastructure, therefore they do not have full control over the service 
performance output. Pratt & Whitney and the JPO agreed on a performance contract for FY 17 where 
the two main incentivized matrices are is the (Non) Mission Capable (NMC) rate of the propulsion 
system and there is a cost management incentive fee. 
 
To produce and sustain critical components of the F135, Pratt & Whitney has partnered with other 
aerospace companies. The two major subcontractors for the F135 are Rolls-Royce and UTC Aerospace 
Systems (UTAS). UTAS provides external controls and engine gearbox. Rolls‑Royce provides the lift 
system for the STOVL variant. As Pratt & Whitney is on a performance contract, it will directly and 
indirectly flow down the PBL metric to its subcontractors. 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Results 
 
The data collected for this research originated from two sources: interviews and (organizational) 
documentations. Appendix A includes the interview guide, which explains the interview procedure and 
the questions asked. Appendix D includes the list of interviewees, their position and their relation to this 
case study. Appendix E includes the most important organizational documentations studied for this 
research. The problem statement of this study is: 
 
What factors influence the service provider’s willingness to take PBC-induced risks and how are these 
risks managed in a service supply chain? 
 
The interviews were constructed in such a manner that this problem statement and the seven 
propositions were addressed. The interviews generated a large amount of rich data. This data was 
compared with the data in the various documents to verify and validate. Subsequently the data was 
compared of the individual interviewees to look for patterns. 
 
The first three propositions in this research are on PBC characteristics. These will be evaluated and 
discussed in paragraph 4.3. 
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The other four propositions are on four factors which influence the service provider’s willingness to bear 
PBC-induced risks: measure and control the performance output, balancing risk and reward across the 
SSC, transferring risk to the subcontractors and relational governance in the SSC. These four factors  
were derived from the study by Selviaridis and Norrman (2014) on the service provider’s willingness to 
bear PBC-induced financial risk in SSC. These propositions (and factors) will be evaluated and discussed 
in paragraph 4.4. 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Propositions regarding the PBC characteristics 
 
In this paragraph the proposition will be evaluated by means of comparison with the gathered data from 
the interview and document study. Sequentially each proposition will be discussed, at the end it’s 
indicated whether the proposition is (partly) supported or not. 
 
Proposition 1 
 
P1: In PBC the financial risks are (to a large extent) transferred to the service provider, while the 
operational risks remain the customer’s responsibility. 
 
In full PBC, a Firm Fixed Price contract, the contractor will be taking on the larger part of the financial 
risk. According to the Customer manager 1: 
 
“Concerning financial and operational risks; in general, government cannot manage financial risks very 
well and the service provider cannot manage operational risks very well. The customer (government) 
must manage operational risks and transfer financial risks to the service provider where possible.” 
 
However, the studied documents, including the current PBL plan, do not mention the transfer of 
financial risk. And the service provider is, at this time, only performance based on a part of the 
sustainment activities. All the interviewees agree that the financial risk transferred to the service 
provider in this contract is (very) limited. 
 
On the second part of the proposition, where it is states the operational risks remain the customer’s 
responsibility, there seems to be more agreement. But it also tends to get a more philosophical debate 
whether one (governmental) organization can contract another organization to be responsible for its 
own core business. According to the Customer manager 1: 
 
“You can hold the service provided financially accountable for financial risks but if he fails, the customer 
is still responsible for the operational risk. In our industry the closest thing possible to this (where the 
service provider provides a service which could be considered a military operational service) is air-to-air 
refueling. But if he does not show up, can’t deliver, you can only penalize in financially. The operational 
risk of not being able to conduct the (fighter/bomber) mission is still on the customer.” 
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And the Customer manager 3: 
 
“In the end it’s the customer who bears the operational risk. When for instance the supply chain breaks 
down and there are no more serviceable parts to get the aircraft operational on the flight line.” 
 
The proposition is not supported. In the contract the financial risks are not to a large extent transferred 
to the service provider. This might be the case in future full PBL contracts. But for now, this proposition 
cannot be supported. 
 
Proposition 2 
 
P2: In PBC, risk is transferred from the customer to the service provider, in return the customer 
incentivizes the performance of the service provider and in doing so balances the risk with the incentive. 
 
The contract shows two incentivized metrics, one on performance and one on costs. The performance 
metric is on the Non Mission Capable (NMC) rate of the engine. The costs metric is on the total cost of 
the contract. The contract does not literally state risk is transferred to the service provider and 
incentives are used to balance this. However, this is where this construct comes down to. According to 
the Service Provider manager 1: 
 
“In the current contract, that is being negotiated, we have a one incentivized metric on performance: 
Non Mission Capable Propulsion System. The objective is X% and threshold is Y%. The incentive is fee or 
profit.” and “So as service provider we are willing to accept an increased amount with risk, but you need 
to be able to control at least a portion of the performance outcome. And it needs to be rewarded.” 
 
And according to the Service Provider manager 3: 
 
“There are financial incentives in place to balance the change in allocation of the risks.” 
 
And the Customer manager 4: 
 
“The key to PBL is to incentive the contractor for reaching a certain performance.” 
 
Proportion 2 is supported. It is not literally stated in the PBL plan (contract) but the current construct is 
in essence what is given in the proposition. The answers from the interviewees show a similar image. 
 
Proposition 3 
 
P3: The more PBC constituents in the contract between the service provider (agent) and the customer 
(principal) contain, the more likely the service provider will behave in the interests of the customer. 
 
The results from the interviews show a corresponding image. All interviewees agree the more 
constituents in the contract the more likely the service provider will behave in the interests of the 
customer. 
 
On the statement “the more PBC constituents, the more the service provider will behave in the interests 
of the customer" all the interviewees agreed. The Service Provider manager 3: 
 “Yes absolutely. From my experience with the 117, the engines on the C-17, I can tell in PBL the service 
provider behaves more in interest of the customer. For instance, we improve the reliability of the parts 
that resulted in an improved Time on Wing. For the service provider this meant fewer parts to be  
repaired (equals less costs), for the customer this meant higher serviceability of the engines (aircraft) and 
significantly improved readiness.” 
 
The Customer manager 2: 
 
“Yes I would agree. The server provider is more responsible for the performance and to manage costs. 
Both are in interest of customer.” 
 
There was one critical note on this statement from the Customer manager 3: 
 
“I don’t necessarily believe that. It all depends how you look at it. The more you move to firm fixed price, 
the more certain you are you know what you have to pay. Right now we’re cost-plus incentive fee, so the 
contractor has got to give us insight in their spending (amount of man-hours). Once you move to firm 
fixed price, you will not have that insight. So you’re paying for certainty, and for not having to go back to 
ask for more money. But you might be paying too much, which is not in the best interest of the customer 
(not best value). There are examples where the contractor didn’t want to go back from firm fixed price to 
cost-plus incentive fee. This because they didn’t want to give insight in their spending after being firm 
fixed price.” 
 
However, since there is no real life data available, there is not enough substantiating evidence to 
support this proposition. Up till now the interviewees expressed their expectations. It is not clear if 
these expectations will manifest themselves. To be able to conclude if the proposition is supported or 
not, more data has to be gathered during the execution of the current contract. In this point of time this 
data is not available. 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Propositions regarding the willingness to bear risks 
 
In this paragraph the propositions regarding the factors influencing the willingness to bear PBC induced 
risk will be discussed. 
 
Proposition 4 
 
P4: The abler the service provider is to measure and control the service performance, the more willing 
the service provider is to bear the risks induce by PBC. 
 
This is one of the more dominant factors mentioned in the interviews. It consists of two parts, the 
measuring and the controlling of the service performance. The measuring of the service performance is 
not considered a major issue. There are clear definitions in the PBL plan how the service performance is 
calculated. There is also a procedure in place to adjudicate and reconcile the data derived from the 
monitoring systems. The amount of control the service provider has on the service performance is 
considered a major factor. 
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Neither the service provider, nor the customer has complete control of the service performance. Both 
parties are for some part of the service performance reliant on the other. Two examples of area where 
the service provider does not have performance control to a great degree are the maintenance on the 
engine performed by the organic unit (warfighter) and Foreign Object Damage2. 
 
Exclusions and Service Level Agreements (SLA’s) on uncontrolled performance output are a way of 
managing and mitigating the risks associated to not having full control. As the Customer manager 3 put 
it: 
 
“As the service provider has more control of his destiny the more willing he is to sign up for PBL. For 
certain activities that the service provider does not control (to a great extent) the service provider will 
want to put a box around if (define exclusions).” 
 
And the Service Provider manager 1: 
 
“As a service provider you are willing to accept an increase amount of risk when you’re able to control 
your destiny. So if we have control over the supply chain, then we are more likely to take on risk 
associated to the performance of that supply chain. A good example would be Non Mission Capable 
Supply which we control and Non Mission Capable Maintenance which we don’t (directly). So it’s all 
about what you have control over. We will take on risks that are acceptable for both parties. If we go 
(full) PBL we will have to put a box around it. So certain events will be out of scope.” And “Because we do 
not control the maintenance performed by the organic unit, we have to make assumptions on this part 
for our models. And since we’re not able to influence that part, we have to limit our exposure to this by 
putting some conditions or boundaries on it.” 
 
All the interviewees consider the ability of the service provider is to measure and control the service 
performance an important factor influencing the willingness to bear PBC induced risks. The exclusions 
and service level agreements in the PBL plan reflect this need to manage and mitigate this factor. 
 
The interview and document data support this proposition. 
 
Proposition 5 
 
P5: The more effective the service provider can balance risk and reward across the SSC, the more willing 
the service provider is to bear the risks induce by PBC. 
 
According to the data derived from the interviews, balancing risk and rewarding takes place between 
the customer and the service provider and between the service provider and the subcontractors. 
Balancing risk and rewarding is a way of managing the risks associated with PBC. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
FOD (Foreign Object Damage)—Any damage or incident attributed to a foreign object that can be expressed in 
physical or economic terms which may or may not degrade the product’s required safety and/or performance 
characteristics.(Technologies, 2009) 
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Customer manager 4: 
 
“We balance change in risk by the PBL plan where we state what is included and excluded in the 
contract. For instance with Foreign Object Damage (FOD) we incorporate risk sharing. In case of minor 
FOD (which could destroy a fan) the service provider would pick up the bill, in case of major FOD (which 
could destroy the entire engine) the customer will pick up the bill. The idea behind risks sharing is that 
the service provider does not have to calculate or price for all risks.” 
 
This is a way of reducing and mitigating the risks for the service provider. 
Customer manager 2 responded to the proposition as follows: 
“Yes, I agree. That is why the JPO is giving the service provider the incentive fee. The service provider can 
use this incentive fee (reward) to incentivize his subcontractors. By using the same metric the service 
provider flows down the risk to the subcontractor.” In addition “... Pratt & Whitney has been working 
with UTAS and Rolls-Royce on their PBL contract. They are flowing our PBL metric down to the 
subcontractors.” 
 
And as the Customer manager 3 put it: 
 
The service provider and their major subcontractor, Rolls-Royce, have an arrangement, “Rolls-Royce 
calls it shared destiny, it’s a kind of balancing the risk and reward. As a customer we are recommending 
the service provider to flow the same amount of risk down to the subcontractors, as they are being 
transferred from the customer.” 
 
The service provider’s responses on the proposition shows a similar image. 
Service Provider manager 2: 
“... As we are engaged with the JPO on the PBL construct, we are also engaging with Rolls-Royce to work 
out the risk and rewards (incentives). This in an effort to support our common goal.” 
 
Service Provider manager 1: 
 
“Yes I would agree with this. We are flowing a similar PBL down to the primes (red. subcontractors). For 
instance for the lift system components, we calculated what percentage over the Non-Mission Capable 
metric flows down to them for the lift fan, role posts and clutch. We calculate based on assumptions, 
reliability, turn times and so on. And because the 3BSM is part of the engine, we flow down a ready to 
install metric to support our NMC. 
 
In order to support or reject this proposition in respect to the construct validity of this research, two 
separate sources of evidence (interviews and documents) are needed for data triangulation. Since the 
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contracts between the service provider and subcontractor(s) were not studied due to privity3, this 
proposition cannot be fully supported. However, the interview data shows a consisted image, where the 
willingness of the service provider to bear the PBC induced risks is positively influenced by service 
provider ability to balance risk and reward across the SSC. It’s therefore concluded this proposition is 
partly supported. 
 
Proposition 6 
 
P6: The abler the service provider is to transfer risk to subcontractors, the more willing the service 
provider is to bear the risks induce by PBC. 
 
During the interviews, it was noted that this proposition and the previous proposition (balancing risk  
and reward across the SSC) are very closely related. With a PBC structure between the service provider 
and the subcontractor, risk is balanced or transferred to the subcontractor and the subcontractors are 
rewarded for the delivered performance. Looking at these propositions from a PBC perspective, 
proposition 6 is part of proposition 5. It comes therefore to no surprise the interview data related to this 
proposition show a strong resemblance with the data associated with proposition 5. 
 
The responses from the interviewees were all in line, both from the customer and the service provider. 
The response from the customer (Customer manager 4) on the proposition: 
“An example is with the lift system where the service provider has a PBL contract with Rolls-Royce. And I 
think there is no other way around that. Service provider flows down the risk, and the incentives as well.” 
 
Service Provider manager 1 stated it strongly in his response to the proposition: 
 
“Yes, I would agree with that. Because if we cannot pass on the risk to the suppliers, and incentivize them 
to do better, we would be taking on all the risk, including their performance as well. Without them being 
held accountable for their performance.” 
 
And the Service Provider manager 3: 
 
“As PW we are flowing down risks to our subcontractors in the form of PBL contracts.” 
 
Service Provider manager 2: 
 
“Yes I would agree. We have been able to mitigate the risks and sharing the risks with the 
subcontractors. We are trying to flow as much risk down to the subcontractor as where they are 
responsible for.” 
 
In order to support or reject this proposition in respect to the construct validity of this research, two 
separate sources of evidence (interviews and documents) are needed. Since the contracts between the 
 
3 
The author is part of the organization of the customer. Studying the contract between the service provider and 
subcontractor could affect the relationship between the service provider and customer. It is there for not allowed. 
Contractor officers refer to this as privity. 
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service provider and subcontractor(s) were not studied due to privity, this proposition cannot be fully 
supported. However, the interview data shows a consisted image, where the willingness of the service 
provider to bear the PBC induced risks is positively influenced by service provider ability to transfer risk 
to the subcontractor. It’s therefore concluded this proposition is also partly supported. 
 
Proposition 7 
 
P7: The more focus on the relational governance between the service provider and the customer, the 
more willing the service provider is to bear the risks induce by PBC. 
 
In the interviews, the relation between the customer and service provider is consistently described as 
good. Concerning trust, all interviewees endorse the importance of trust in a PBC relationship. As the 
Customer manager 3 expressed it: 
 
“I think the whole point of going PBL is having that trust relationship where you will not have thick 
contracts. In every contract negotiation, you need some kind of trust. Or else it does not make sense to 
start in the first place. My assessment would be that in the PBL contract you would have to rely more on 
thrust as in conventional contracts.” 
 
Service Provider manager 1: 
 
“As far as taking on more risk because of the trust, I guess in general you would think so” 
 
Service Provider manager 2: 
 
“It takes more trust to move from dictating what, how and when things should be done, to defining the 
desired performance and letting the other party decide on the how and when.” 
 
However, during the interviews it became evident relational governance was not a factor of major 
importance during the development of the PBC contract. Most of the answers concerning this 
proposition were based on opinion. The Service Provider manager 1 also added: 
 
“Trust is good in the working environment, but went it comes to payment I think it’s better to have it 
written out in a contract. And it’s important to have clear inclusions, exclusions, calculations and 
boundaries.” 
 
In the proposed PBC contract the service provider is not given a lot of room to make his own decisions. 
This is how the Service Provider manager 2 said it: 
 
“… and then there is the “mother may I” factor, where in some cases the service provider has to ask [the 
customer] permission to take certain actions... I would say with this new contract the service provider 
has medium control on this value stream. For instance, we are still not able to decide where we sent 
engines [red. the location of spare engines can influence the down time of an aircraft and thus the NMC 
rate, the service performance] .” 
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Although both parties agree relational governance and trust play an important role in PBC, there was 
not enough data in the documents to support this proposition. The Propulsion Performance Based 
Logistics (PBL) Plan and Performance Work Statement gives the service provider limited freedom of 
movement and control. This can also be seen in the number of Contract Line Items Numbers (CLIN’s4) in 
the contract. The more CLIN’s in the contract, the harder it is for the service provider to transfer funds 
from one part of the contract to the other, when they see it fit to meet the desired performance level. 
This limited transfer of control to the service provider, does not indicate a high level of trust5. 
 
 
 
 
4.5 Other factors influencing the service provider’s willingness 
 
Besides the four factors from Selviaridis and Norrman on the factors influencing the willingness to bear 
risk, three other major factors emerged during and after the interviews. These factors are the chosen 
growth path toward full PBC, the ability to make accurate forecasts and the length of the contract. These 
three factors will be discussed below. 
 
4.5.1 Influencing factors and how they are managed 
 
These three factors generate uncertainty, which translates in risk. How this risk is managed or mitigated 
influences the service provider’s willingness to bear the risk. The factors and how they are managed and 
or mitigated is will be described below. 
 
Ability to make accurate forecasts in relation to the maturity of the system 
 
At the moment, the F-135 is still in the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. This 
means the engine is technically not fully mature. The data the engine currently generates on reliability, 
maintainability and serviceability might not be representative for future sustainment costs and 
performance. This generates uncertainty. 
 
The same is true considering the service supply chain. At the moment the F-35’s fleet consists of 166 
aircraft all stationed in the United States of America and spread over 12 (F135 related) sites. The coming 
years, the fleet will grow considerably, and the service supply chain will have to keep up. In 2020 the F- 
35 fleet will have grown to 651 aircraft stationed in 11 different countries and spread over 41 (F135 
related) sites. This growth will be accompanied with uncertainty, as there are no figures or experience to 
build a reliable forecast model for this venture. As the Customer manager 4 put it: 
 
 
4 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart 4.10—Contract Line Items Number: contracts may identify the items 
or services to be acquired as separately identified line items. Contract line items should provide unit prices or lump 
sum prices for separately identifiable contract deliverables, and associated delivery schedules or performance 
periods. CLIN’s serve two purposes: (1) they break the contract down by the commodities being procured (labor 
hours of services, funding for travel, quantity of product A, quantity of product B, etc.) and (2) they provide for 
traceable accounting classification citations. 
 
 
5 
Comment of Service Provider: the number of CLIN’s is driven by Government cost accounting rules and is not 
indicative of a lack of trust. 
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“That’s why we are currently not on fixed price contract; there are too many known and unknown 
unknowns. This has to do with the maturity of the system. It would be unaffordable to go fixed price in 
this stage of the program. The aim of the program is to go to cost per flying hour in 2020.” 
 
The inability to make accurate forecasts creates risks that have to be managed. In this study two 
mitigation measures were recognized: the length of the contract and growing towards full PBC. These 
two factors will be addressed later in this chapter. 
 
Although it has not been expressed as formal strategy by the JPO, the studied document and previous 
contracts show a similar corresponding image. Where the immaturity of the system and the subsequent 
inability to make accurate forecasts are related to the amount of risk that is being transferred to the 
service provider. The more immature the system, the more risks are involved, the higher the price to 
transfer the risks to the service provider. That’s one of the reasons the contracts have been Cost-plus 
(incentive fee). The Customer manager 1 said it as follows: 
 
“In general you pay large amount of money for transferring high-risk capabilities to the service provider. 
The service provider is going to charge to customer for the uncertainty. Transferring these kind of 
capabilities will not translate good value. Low risk capabilities are therefore more suited to be 
transferred to the service provider.” 
 
The growth path toward full PBC 
 
A way of handling uncertainty in a maturing environment is to take small incremental contract steps 
toward full PBC (Firm Fixed Price). By only transferring the sustainment activities where the service 
provider in comfortable in providing, the customer is likely to receive better value instead of transferring 
the entire sustainment operation. 
 
In the FY17 contract, just the sustainment activities related to engineering and support labor is on full 
PBC (Firm Fixed Price). The sustainment activities related to the repair of parts is still on Cost-plus 
Incentive Fee. According to the Customer manager 2: 
 
“The financial risks are not severe (red. in the FY17 contract) since only a portion of the contract is from 
fixed-price. And the service provider has a lot of data and confidence on the part that it is now firm fixed- 
price. The service provider is now solely responsible for all the (engineering) labor related to sustainment 
of the engines. For the repairs it is still CPIF, this because there’s too much unknown about the amount 
engines and modules that will have to be repaired. It would be too costly at the moment to go firm fixed- 
price. 
 
And the Service Provider manager 3: 
 
“The contract FY 17 through FY 19 can be considered as a steppingstone. At the moment the financial 
risks are limited as the scope of the PBL contract is limited. This phase will be used for data gathering  
and metric monitoring. Because of the system is not fully mature small steps are taken to limited to risk.” 
 
And the Customer manager 3: 
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“The contractor is quite confident they will be able to meet the metric. In the past he has shown he is 
able to meet the metric quite comfortably.” 
 
“We are taking small steps towards PBL (firm fixed price), the reason is that the contractor has got to be 
comfortable with the performance data that is at hand. Once he’s comfortable with the data and he 
thinks he can deliver (earning a reasonable amount of fee) he’s willing to sign up. If he’s not, the risks will 
be too great and he will price those.” 
 
This factor is closely related to the ability to make accurate forecasts and could be considered as a way 
of handling the uncertainty of the immaturity of the technical system and service supply chain. 
 
Length of the contract 
 
All interviewees agree that the length of the contract influences the service provider’s willingness to 
bear the risk. It influences the willingness in different ways and has a relation with the maturity of the 
system and supply chain, the behavior of the service provider, the trust relationship and uncertainty 
concerning contract renewal. 
 
The current contracts are limited to one year. There is the possibility to add option years, which can be 
executed without having to start negotiations. The FY17 contract between the service provider and 
customer is one year with two option years. 
 
The looked-for length of the contract depends on the uncertainty related to the maturity of the system 
and supply chain. Or as the Customer manager 3, said it: 
 
“The length of the contract is another way the financial risks are managed. In the beginning the 
contractor is not interested in setting up a five-year contract. In the beginning it is too uncertain what  
the cost of flying hour would be. And if in year 1 the calculations do not seem to be right, five years is 
long time. So financial risks are managed by the maturity of the system relation to the length of contract. 
Getting real representative data of the maturity of the system is a way to manage risk. With a one-year 
contract the contractor does not have enough time to improve the parts. So in that case to PBL construct 
doesn’t work.” 
 
For the sustainment activities where the data is representative and so where there is less uncertainty for 
the service provider, the service provider would like have longer contracts. In these instances the service 
provider can invest in service performance and see a return on investment. This is what the Service 
Provider manager 2 said: 
 
“The one-year contract prevents us from buying a large amount of parts for the coming years based on 
the forecasted utilization. This prevents us from negotiating a lower price for the parts. For us an 
optimum contract length is five years. This will give us enough certainty to invest in our subcontractor 
supply base and part.” 
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And the Service Provider manager 1: 
 
“We need to invest to improve performance outcome. That could be investing in our own repair 
developments or materials. The contract should be long enough to get some of the return of investment. 
The consensus is that the length of contract should be 5 years6.” 
 
Short term contract could also influence the behavior of the service provider is an unwanted manner. 
According to the Customer manager 3: 
 
“In a short-term contract, the service provider will do anything to meet the metric. Even if that would 
mean using up all the parts. The next contract will have to be renegotiated. This kind of behavior would 
not be in the best interest of the customer.” 
 
4.6 Evaluation of propositions 
 
In this chapter we challenged the propositions using the data from the interviews and the documents. In 
the process we found three more factor influencing the service provider’s willingness to bear PBL 
induced risks. Figure 6 given an overview of the four proposition and the three additional found factors. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Factors influencing the willingness of the service provider to bear PBC induces risks 
 
Of the four propositions on the influencing factors, two were supported and two were partly supported 
by the data from the interviews and the documents. The table below provides an overview of all the 
propositions, the findings and the results of this study. 
 
 
6 
Additional comment from service provider: longer contracts, a ten year or more arrangement, would be better to 
incentivize investment. 
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Proposition Finding Result 
1: In PBC the financial risks are (to a 
large extent) transferred to the service 
provider, while the operational risks 
remain the customer’s responsibility. 
In the current contract the financial risks are not 
largely transferred to the service provider. Both 
sources, the interview data and the document 
data, show the same result. 
Not supported 
2: In PBC, risk is transferred from the 
customer to the service provider, in 
return the customer incentivizes the 
performance of the service provider 
and in doing so balances the risk with 
the incentive. 
Both sources show that risk is transferred from 
the customer to the service provider, and the 
customer incentivized the performance. 
Supported 
3: The more PBC constituents in the 
contract between the service provider 
(agent) and the customer (principal) 
contain, the more likely the service 
provider will behave in the interests of 
the customer. 
Although almost all the interviewees expect that 
the further you move toward a full performance 
contract, the more the service provider will 
behave in the interest of the customer, it cannot 
be stated for certain. It is too early in the 
process to notice any change in behavior. 
Besides that, the FY17 contract is a transitional 
contract, a step towards a full performance 
contract. 
Not supported 
4: The abler the service provider is to 
measure and control the service 
performance, the more willing the 
service provider is to bear the risks 
induce by PBC. 
All the interviewees consider the ability of the 
service provider is to measure and control the 
service performance an important factor 
influencing the willingness to bear PBC induced 
risks. The exclusions in the contract reflect this 
need to manage and mitigate this factor. 
Supported 
5: The more effective the service 
provider can balance risk and reward 
across the SSC, the more willing the 
service provider is to bear the risks 
induce by PBC. 
The interview data show the ability to balance 
risk and reward across the SSC positively 
influences the service provider’s willingness to 
bear risk. However, contracts between the 
service provider and subcontractor could not be 
validated due to privity: the customer cannot 
see the contract between the service provider 
and subcontractor. 
Partly 
supported 
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6: The abler the service provider is to 
transfer risk to subcontractors, the 
more willing the service provider is to 
bear the risks induce by PBC. 
The interview data show the ability to balance 
risk and reward across the SSC positively 
influences the service provider’s willingness to 
bear risk. However, contracts between the 
service provider and subcontractor could not be 
validated due to privity: the customer cannot 
see the contract between the service provider 
and subcontractor. 
Partly 
supported 
7: The more focus on the relational 
governance between the service 
provider and the customer, the more 
willing the service provider is to bear 
the risks induce by PBC. 
Although all interviewees agree relational 
governance and trust play an important role in 
PBC, the current PBL plan and PWS does not 
support this; the service provider is not given a 
large amount of control. 
Not supported 
Table 2: Proposition, result and clarification 
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5 Conclusion, Discussion and Recommendations 
 
In the previous chapter the results of the search were presented. In this chapter, conclusions will be 
drawn based on these results. In paragraph 5.1 the conclusions will be discussed, followed by a 
discussion on the results. This chapter will be concluded with recommendations for future research and 
business. 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
In the last decade, PBC plays an increasingly important role in the defense industry of the United States. 
In PBC, risk is an essential consideration as PBC changes the nature of the risk and its allocation. This 
shift in risk raises important questions concerning the identification and management of risks under 
PBC. To date, little empirical research has been carried out on the management of risk under PBC. 
According to Selviaridis and Norrman (2014), it remains unclear which factors impact the contractor’s 
willingness to bear PBC-induced risks and how these risks are or could be handled in practice. This study 
is on what factors influence the service provider’s willingness to take PBC-induced risks and how these 
risks are managed in a service supply chain. Insight in these factors could enable the customer and 
service provider to improve their relationship, service performance and future contracts. 
 
To address and focus the problem statement of this research seven propositions were created. These 
propositions are based on the researched literature. The first three propositions are on PBC 
characteristics, the other four are on the factors influencing the willingness of the service provider. 
 
Regarding the propositions on the PBC characteristics, the study supports that in PBC risk is transferred 
from the customer to the service provider, and the customer incentivizes the performance. The other 
two propositions could not be supported. In the current contract, the financial risks are not largely 
transferred to the service provider. This is because the current contract is a transitional contract  
towards full PBC. Similarly, this study could not support the proposition that more PBC constituents in a 
contract, would led the service provider to behave more in the interests of the customer. The reason for 
this is that it is too early in the process to notice any behavioral change. Besides that, this is a 
transitional contract, a steppingstone which eventually will turn in to a full performance contract. 
 
Concerning the factors influencing the service provider’s willingness, not all four factors found in the 
literature could be supported by this study. The service provider’s performance attributability however, 
was indeed found to be a strong factor influencing the service provider’s willingness. In addition, this 
study shows two methods on how this factor can be managed by the customer and service provider: 
Service Level Agreements and exclusions. The factors on the service provider’s ability to transfer risk to 
subcontractors and to balance risk and reward across the SSC could only be partly supported. The main 
cause for this, is that the contracts between the service provider and subcontracts could not be used for 
verification. The data derived from the interviews however, did confirm these as influencing factors. 
Although all interviewees agree relational governance and trust is important in PBC, the current 
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performance work statement does not support this; the service provider is not given a large amount of 
control. 
 
The four factors obtained from literature were not the most prominent ones observed in this case 
(study). During the study three more factors were found that strongly influence the willingness: the 
chosen growth path towards toward full PBC, the ability to make accurate forecasts and the length of 
the contract. Although these factors are not completely new in literature in relation to performance 
contracting, in this study their part is more prominent as their presence in present-day literature. This 
could be explained by the specific (risk) characteristics of the studied case. Simultaneously developing, 
producing and sustaining a major component as a jet engine on this scale is unprecedented and is 
accompanied with a unique risk pattern. 
 
In the end, six factors were found affecting the service provider’s willingness to bear PBC-induced risks. 
In addition, this study showed how these factors were handled in practice. A service provider and 
customer, when engaging in a PBC relationship should take these six factors in to consideration, 
especially in a changing (transforming) environment where there is substantial uncertainty. 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Discussion 
 
In this paragraph, the seven studied factors (four from literature and three from the interviews) on the 
service provider’s willingness are discussed. 
 
Service provider’s performance attributability 
 
Of all factors, the performance attributability is most predominant. All the interviewees addressed this 
factor as one of the most important factors. This is in line with what was found in literature, especially in 
the major article for this study by Selviaridis and Norrman (2014). However, this article does not go in to 
great detail on how this factor can be managed. In this study two ways were identified on how the risk  
of not having total performance attributability (total control of the service performance) are managed, 
by: exclusions and Service Level Agreements (SLA’s). Where the service provider is not completely in 
control of the service performance, the service provider wants to exclude (some of these) risks. An 
example of this is Foreign Object Damage (FOD). As long as jet engines suck in huge quantities of air,  
FOD will occur by objects caught in the airstream. Because the service provider has no control over this, 
he wants to exclude (part of) this. In this case, this risk is shared between the customer and service 
provider as discussed in paragraph 4.4. The SLA’s come in to play when the service provider is  
dependent on another entity to perform part of the service performance. An example of this is the 
maintenance performed by the organic unit (customer). How well the unit performs the maintenance 
affects the total service performance. The service provider only accepts this lack of performance control 
when the organic unit (customer) performs above a certain service level. This service level is formalized 
in the SLA’s. When the unit fails to live up to these SLA’s, the service provider will have to be 
compensated for loss of service performance. There is a procedure in place between the customer and 
service provider to reconcile disputed service performance. In paragraph 2.1 the “customer-supplier 
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duality” (Sampson, 2000) was discussed, explaining that in the SSC the customer is one the primary 
supplies of process inputs. In this case, besides being one of the primary supplies of process inputs, the 
customer is also actively responsible for delivering part the service performance. Exclusions and SLA’s 
are not described in literature as a way to handed lack of performance attributability. This finding can be 
seen as a detailed addition to the current articles on this topic. 
 
Length of the contract 
 
As shown in paragraph 2.5, according to Gardner (2008) one of the best ways for service providers to 
ensure profitability and reduce (financial) risk is to secure longer contracts. Mouzas confirms this in his 
2016 study. This is in line with formal guidelines of the Defense Acquisition University ((DAU), 2005b), 
that states that the length of the contract is one of the critical facilitating elements of PBC. According to 
DAU the service provider prefers long-term contracts. This is consistent with what was found in this 
study. The reasons for this preference given by DAU are also consistent to what was in this study: the 
service provider wants to be confident that they will receive an adequate Return on Investment (ROI) 
and they want to be confident in continuing cash flow. As describes in paragraph 2.2, according to 
Cohen & Kunreuther (2007) long term contracts are considered a risk mitigation tool in their Supply 
Chain Risk Management Framework. This study also shows that the length of the contract is a factor 
influencing the service provider’s willingness to bear PBL induced risks. That is a confirmation of what 
was found in the literature. One of interviewees explained how federal law restricts the use of multi- 
year contracts. This restriction poses challenges for the customer to provide the service provider 
adequate confidence to invest in a long-term relationship. 
 
Ability to make accurate forecasts 
 
The interviews show that the ability to make accurate forecasts an important factor is in relation to the 
service provider’s willingness to bear PBC induced risks. Especially the uncertainty related to the 
technical performance of the aircraft due to immaturity and growing (global) sustainment footprint feed 
into the inability to make accurate forecasts. This is closely related to what is described in paragraph 2.5 
where Brown and Burke (2000) concluded that accurate historical data records are critical to effectively 
manage performance risks. If a risk cannot be managed (well), the service provider is less willing to bear 
that risk. In the current relationship, this risk or factor is managed by using the growth path toward full 
PBL as described in the next paragraph. In addition, a growing (global) sustainment footprint 
complicated the supply network and increases the risk (Harland, 2003), as described in paragraph 2.2. 
This study gives an example on how performance risks caused by the inability to make accurate 
forecasts can be managed in practice. This finding can be seen as a detailed addition to the current 
literature on this topic. 
 
Growth path towards toward full PBC 
 
Although it can be found in literature that the amount of risk is gradually transferred from the customer 
to the service provider (Gruneberg et al., 2007), it was not identified as a factor influencing the 
willingness of the service provider to bear the PBC induced risks. This study not only showed this growth 
path is a factor; it also shows several dimensions or ways to grow towards PBC. One of the ways is 
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described by Glas et al. (2013) and handles on progressing on the PBC continuum (figure 3): from Cost- 
plus contracts to full PBC. This is described in paragraph 2.4. Another way is the scope of the 
performance contract. What was seen during the interviews and studying of the documents, is that the 
parts where the service provider is confident in achieving the service performance (low risk) are on 
performance basis. Where there is (still) a lot of uncertainty and thus risk (because of the immaturity of 
the technical system and supply chain), that part of the contract remains on transaction basis. This last 
dimension is not prominently addressed in literature as a factor influencing the willingness of the service 
provider to bear PBC incudes risks, in particular not the way it is managed. This finding can be seen as a 
detailed addition to the current literature on this topic. 
 
Transfer risk to the subcontractor(s) and balance risks across the service supply chain 
 
These two factors are closely related when the service provider has a PBC relationship with its 
subcontractors. With a PBC structure between the service provider and the subcontractor, risk is 
balanced or transferred to the subcontractor and the subcontractors are rewarded for the delivered 
performance. During the interviews a consistent image emerged, where the ability to transfer and 
balance risk across the service supply chain (between service provider and the subcontractor) positively 
influenced the service provider to bear PBC induced risks. This is in keeping with what by Selviaridis and 
Norrman (2014) found. In that sense, these findings can be considered a confirmation of their study 
results. 
 
Relational governance 
 
There are numerous articles stressing the importance of relational governance. Selviaridis and Norrman 
(2014) stated that: “performance achievement in service supply chains is a team effort requiring close 
collaboration, a win-win mentality, information sharing, and the flexibility required to test different 
incentive systems”. All the interviewees agree with this and endorse the notion relational governance 
plays an important role in the PBC relationship. However, the emphasis on the contractual governance 
has not changed; the contract structure is very much the same. Although there is a Performance Work 
Statement now instead of a Statement of Work7, the level of detail (number of Contract Line Item 
Numbers (CLIN’s)) has not changed. This entails that the service provider is not given more control, 
something one would expect when moving toward a performance based contract. The fact that there 
has not been a noticeable shift from contractual governance to relational governance could be because 
this performance contract is a transitional contract. Moreover, one does not want to change too much 
when stepping into unfamiliar territory. The findings in this study however do mirror the findings by 
Zheng et al. (2008), who found that contractual governance should be seen as crucial but not sufficient 
‘qualifier’ and therefore should be complemented with pro-active relational governance. 
 
See appendix F for an overview of the studied factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
Used in traditional transactional type contracts. 
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5.1 Recommendations for business 
 
Managing the risks induced by PBC is a complicated matter. This study has several implications for 
entities operating in a PBC environment, specifically for the service provider and the customer. All the 
previous mentioned factors influence the service provider’s willingness to bear PBC induced risks to a 
greater or lesser extent. Awareness of these factors could improve the ability to align the goals of the 
customer and service provider, one of the aims of PBC. 
 
Particularly the service provider’s performance attributability is a factor to take in to account in PBC 
relationships. This study provides two methods to manage this factor. Although more study on this 
subject is recommended, these methods can be taken in consideration when performance attributability 
is an issue in the PBC relationship. 
 
Being a program in development, this case study is held in an environment where there is not enough 
data available to make accurate forecasts on future costs. This is a considerable risk factor for a 
customer and service provider in a PBC relationship. In this case, the service provider and customer 
applied a stepped or phased growth path to manage the risk of not being able to make accurate 
forecasts. Essentially using a performance contact for the portions where the risk is acceptable and 
using a standard transactional contract for the portions where uncertainty causes a higher, 
unacceptable (and thus unaffordable) risk. This approach can be used in similar situations to mitigate 
the risk factor of not being able to make accurate forecasts. 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Recommendations for future research 
 
Although a lot of time and effort has been put into this study, it has its limitations. Initially this study was 
set up as an embedded multi case design. However, during the study one of the main units of analysis 
withdrew its commitment to the study, leaving a single case design. A single case design like this one has 
its limitations. This case has specific characteristics unique by time (maturity of the technical system and 
supply chain) and place (market). Because this is a single case, the results cannot be generalized. It’s 
therefore recommended replicate to this study when both the technical system and the supply chain are 
in a stable, full grown state. It will be interesting to see how this case changes over time, particularly the 
growth path in relation to the maturity of the technical system and the global service supply chain. Yin 
(2003) refers to this as a longitudinal case. On a related note, this performance contract is a transitional 
contract, a stepping stone to full PBL. Although this contract is set up with a full PBL in mind, it could be 
argued a transitional contract does not have all the same influencing factors as a full PBL contract. This is 
another argument to replicate this study when the contract type evolves toward full PBL. 
 
Furthermore, it’s suggested to conduct this study with different customer and service provider 
relationships in order to compare the results. If these case studies produce the same result, this will 
expand the external generalizability of this study 
 
This case study is conducted in a situation where there is limited competition at the moment of 
conducting this study. It’s recommended to conduct this study in a market situation where there is more 
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competition to study the effects of competition on the factors influencing the service provider’s 
willingness to bear PBC induced risks. 
 
Because the author is part of the customer’s organization, reviewing the contracts between the service 
provider and subcontractor could jeopardize the relation between the customer and the service 
provider. This is the reason the contracts between the service provider and subcontractors were not 
studied. Because of this, two propositions could not be fully supported: transfer risk to the 
subcontractor(s) and balance risks across the service supply chain. It’s therefore recommended to 
conduct a study where these documents are part of the study. 
 
There were two ways identified on how the risk of not having total performance attributability (total 
control of the service performance) can be managed: exclusions and Service Level Agreements (SLA’s). 
It’s recommended to study the lack of total control of the service performance by the service provider 
and to study how this risk is managed in other PBC relationships. This in order to explore if these two 
managing techniques are also used in other situations and if there are other techniques to managing this 
risk factor. 
 
This study identifies the applied growth path toward full PBC as a factor influencing the willingness of 
the service provider to bear PBC induced risk. In literature, this is not addressed as such. It’s 
recommended to study this in more detail. This could be performed in environments where a lack of 
(mature) data causes an elevated risk. 
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Year of Publication Number of articles 
1964-1973 3 
1974-1983 4 
1984-1993 9 
1994-2003 18 
2004-2013 74 
2014- present day 17 
Total 125 
Table 3: Overview of referenced articles by publication year 
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Appendix A Interview Guide 
 
 
 
 
Interview Guide 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
as part of the case study research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The handling of risks induced by performance- 
based contracting in service supply chains 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interviewee : 
Position : 
Interviewer : Major Jeroen van Strien 
Date : 
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Introduction 
 
I want to thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. This interview is part of the study on the 
handling of risks induced by performance-based contracting in service supply chains. The problem 
statement of the study is defined as followed: 
 
What factors influence the service provider’s willingness to take PBC-induced risks and how are these 
risks managed in a service supply chain? 
 
It’s my believe that have a better understanding of these factors could help us to improve contracts and 
possibly the relationship between the customer and service provider. 
 
I would like to talk to you about your experiences with PBC, more specific PBC-induced risks and 
associated factors. The interview should take around an hour. Although I will be taking some notes 
during the session, I can’t possibly write fast enough to get it all down. So if you don’t mind, I would like 
to tape the session because I don’t want to miss any of your comments. 
 
I would like emphasize that all responses will be kept confidential and all the interview data will be  
made anonymous. This means that your interview responses can only be shared with my research 
supervisors at the Open University in The Netherlands and I will ensure that any information I include in 
my report does not identify you as the respondent. Recorded interview data will not be shared or played 
to anyone else but the people present at this interview. 
 
Do you have any comments or questions about what I have just explained? 
 
After this interview I will process all your responses. Before I use the data, I will ask you to go over the 
responses I’ve written down to make sure I captured it correctly. If you have any questions during or 
after the interview about the questions or procedure, please do not hesitate to ask. 
 
The interview questions are clustered in different topics: as there are general PBC questions, risk related 
to PBC, contract design, willingness to bear PBC induced risk by the service provider and closing 
question. So let’s get started. 
 
Performance Based Contracting / Logistics 
This research is about PBC and is defined as: a product support / sustainment strategy used to achieve 
measurable performance outcomes for a weapon system or subsystem. A PBC approach focuses on 
developing strategic performance metrics and directly relating contracting payment to performance 
against these metrics. 
 
 
General questions 
1. Can you describe the organization you work for (core business, products/services, key 
customers/suppliers)? [information is given, there is an opportunity to correct and add] 
2. What does your job entail? 
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3. Can you tell something about what your tasks, authority and responsibilities are in relation to 
performance based contracting? 
PBC induced risk 
It has been shown that PBC alters the (allocation of) risk in the service supply chain. 
 
4. Which risks are associated with the PBC? 
a. Which financial risks are identified (please describe)? How severe are these? In what 
extent are these risks are transferred to the service provider? How are the financial risks 
managed? How did that work out? 
b. Which operational risks are identified (please describe)? How severe are these? In what 
extent are these risks are transferred to the customer? How are the operational risks 
managed? How did that work out? 
5. Were there any mechanisms in the contract to balance the (possible) change in allocation of the 
risks? (Ask for examples). For service providers: how was this the case in the contract with the 
subcontractor? 
6. In PBC risk is transferred to the service provider, wherein the customer builds in incentives for 
the realization of the performance. Which incentives are applied? What results have been 
achieved? Does it help to align incentives and goals? For service providers: how was this the 
case in the contract with the subcontractor? 
7. What is the customers view on the use of incentives (willingness to pay performance bonuses or 
risk premium)? 
There is wide range for PBC contract ranging from cost-plus incentive fee to full PBC. PBC constituents in 
this research are defined as PBC components in the contract, where the cost-plus incentive fee has 
limited PBC constituents and full PBC has a maximum of PBC constituents. 
8. In case of PBC it is said that: "the more PBC constituents, the more the service provider will 
behave in the interests of the customer". Do you agree with this statement? What PBC 
constituents have been applied in your case? Can you give examples and explain how they affect 
performance? 
9. Which performance metric is agreed upon in the contract? Is this metric being met? If yes, how? 
If not, why not? What can you tell me on the cooperation and commitment of the service 
provider on reaching the desired performance? Did the PBC contribute to this performance and 
in what way? How did that work in practice? 
10. How does the payment/incentive structure impact on customer/supplier behavior? 
 
 
Willingness to bear PBC induced risk 
Willingness to bear PBC induced risk denotes the service provider accepts the terms (e.g. allocation of 
risk) in the contract and commits to successful execution. 
 
 
11. Are you as service provider prepared to accept an increased amount of risk in this specific 
customer/supplier contract? Under what conditions? 
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12. What factors positively influence the service provider willingness to bear PBC induced risk? 
Please elaborate. (Ask for specific examples. Relation with paragraphs in current or future 
contract?) 
13. What factors negatively influence the service provider willingness to bear PBC induced risk? 
Please elaborate. (Ask for specific examples. Relation with paragraphs in current or future 
contract?) 
14. In case of PBC it is said that: "as the service provider is better able to measure and control the 
service performance, the more willing the service provider is to bear PBC induced risks". Do you 
agree with this statement? How is the performance measured in your case? What can you tell 
me on the extent of control the service provider has on the service performance (are there 
many exclusions)? How does this influence the willingness? Can you give examples and explain 
how this affects performance? 
15. In case of PBC it is said that: "as there is more control based on trust and relational governance 
(and not on the basis of contracts), the more willing the service provider is to bear PBC induced 
risks". Do you agree with this statement? How would you describe the relationship in terms of 
collaboration, thrust and flexibility? How is the relationship between service provider and 
customer regulated? For service providers, and with the subcontractors? Can you give examples 
and explain how these affect performance? 
16. On relational governance, how would you describe the relationship between the service 
provider and the subcontractor in terms of collaboration, thrust and flexibility? 
17. In case of PBC it is said that: "as the service provider is better able to pass on risks to 
subcontractors, the more willing the service provider is to bear PBC induced risks". Do you agree 
with this statement? In your case, are the risks transferred to subcontractors (are there any PBC 
constituents in the contract between the service provider and the subcontractor)? How is the 
subcontractor rewarded for this risk taking? Can you give examples and explain how these affect 
performance? 
18. How would you describe the subcontractor willingness to bear PBC induced risks? In this 
respect, how would you describe the subcontract ability to influence the end customer 
performance? 
19. In case of PBC it is said that: "as the service provider is better able to balance risks and rewards, 
the more willing the service provider is to bear PBC induced risks". Do you agree with this 
statement? How are risks and rewards balanced in your case? Can you give examples and 
explain how this affect performance? What is the service providers view on risk and reward 
sharing with the subcontractor? 
 
 
Closing questions 
20. Access to complementary documents (e.g. contracts)? 
21. Suggestions for other interviewees and/or research issues? 
22. OK to come back for supplementary questions? 
Thank you for your time. 
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
Interview process 
 
The flowchart on the data collection process, including the interview process, is attached in appendix A. 
The data collection process consists of 11 steps. Each step will be clarified below. Figure 1 shows the 
flowchart of these steps. 
 
1. The first step is to identify the best candidates for the interviews. The “best candidate” in this 
context is considered the person and or official who can contribute the most to get a clear 
understanding of factors influencing the service provider’s willingness to take PBC-induced risks 
and how are these risks managed in a service supply chain. 
2. After the candidates are identified, they will be approached either direct or through their 
supervisor, depending on the situation. The candidate will receive the elementary information 
of the interview, as there are the goal of the research, the goal the interviews, anonymity and 
what will happen with the derived data. 
3. Up next will be setting the actual appointment. A copy of this interview guide will be send to the 
interviewee so he or she knows what to expect. 
4. The preparation of the interview includes reserving a suitable location to conduct the interview 
and preparing al necessary paperwork and equipment. 
5. During the introduction the following topics will be addressed: goal of the research, the goal the 
interview, the interview process, agreements on privacy (anonymity), the use of voice recorder, 
the use of data and data security. 
6. During the interview the information will recorded on a voice recorder and written on paper. 
7. At the end of the interview the next steps (8 to 12) will be explained. 
8. The information/data from the interview will be processed. This involves writing an interview 
report based on data from the voice recorder and notes and recollections. 
9. When the draft interview report is finished it will be send to the interviewee for adjudication. 
10. Depending on the comments the report will adjusted and send back to the interviewee for 
confirmation or the final interview report will be stored. 
11. The data will be stored in the interview report and in the case study database. The data will 
serve as input for the research. 
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Figure 1: Interview Data Collection Process 
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Appendix B Relationship between research sources and propositions 
 
Table 2: Relationship between the research sources and propositions 
Propositions with dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources 
Documents 
Current contract between customer and service provider   
Subsequent contract (draft) between customer and service providers 
Organizational (guidance) material 
Contract between service provider and subcontractor 
General questions 
1. Can you describe the organization you work for (core business, products/services, key customers/suppliers)? 
2. What does your job entail? 
3. Can you tell something about what your tasks, authority and responsibilities are in relation to performance based contracting? 
PBC induced risk 
4. Which risks are associated with the PBC? 
a. Which financial risks are identified (please describe)? How severe are these? In what extent are these risks are transferred to the service provider? How are the 
financial risks managed? How did that work out? 
b. Which operational risks are identified (please describe)? How severe are these? In what extent are these risks are transferred to the customer? How are the 
operational risks managed? How did that work out? 
5. Were there any mechanisms in the contract to balance the (possible) change in allocation of the risks? (Ask for examples) For service providers: how was this the 
case in the contract with the subcontractor? 
6. In PBC risk is transferred to the service provider, wherein the customer builds in incentives for the realization of the performance. Which incentives are applied? 
What results have been achieved? Does it help to align incentives and goals? For service providers: how was this the case in the contract with the subcontractor? 
7. What is the customers view on the use of incentives (willingness to pay performance bonuses or risk premium)? 
8. In case of PBC it is said that: "the more PBC constituents, the more the service provider will behave in the interests of the customer". Do you agree with this 
statement? What PBC constituents have been applied in your case? Can you give examples and explain how they affect performance? 
9. Which performance metric is agreed upon in the contract? Is this metric being met? If yes, how? If not, why not? What can you tell me on the cooperation and 
commitment of the service provider on reaching the desired performance? Did the PBC contribute to this performance and in what way? How did that work in 
practice? 
10. How does the payment/incentive structure impact on customer/supplier behavior? 
Willingness to bear PBC induced risk 
11. Are you as service provider prepared to accept an increased amount of risk in this specific customer/supplier contract? Under what conditions? 
12. What factors positively influence the service provider willingness to bear PBC induced risk? Please elaborate. (Ask for specific examples. Relation with 
paragraphs in current or future contract?) 
13. What factors negatively influence the service provider willingness to bear PBC induced risk? Please elaborate. (Ask for specific examples. Relation with 
paragraphs in current or future contract?) 
14. In case of PBC it is said that: "as the service provider is better able to measure and control the service performance, the more willing the service provider is to 
bear PBC induced risks". Do you agree with this statement? How is the performance measured in your case? What can you tell me on the extent of control the 
service provider has on the service performance (are there many exclusions)? Can you give examples and explain how this affects performance? 
15. In case of PBC it is said that: "as more there is control based on trust and relational governance (and not on the basis of contracts), the more willing the service 
provider is to bear PBC induced risks". Do you agree with this statement? How would you describe the relationship in terms of collaboration, thrust and flexibility? 
How is the relationship between service provider and customer regulated? For service providers, and with the subcontractors? Can you give examples and explain 
how this affect performance? 
16. On relational governance, how would you describe the relationship between the service provider and the subcontractor in terms of collaboration, thrust and 
flexibility? 
17. In case of PBC it is said that: "as the service provider is better able to pass on risks to subcontractors, the more willing the service provider is to bear PBC 
induced risks". Do you agree with this statement? In your case, are the risks transferred to subcontractors (are there any PBC constituents in the contract between 
the service provider and the subcontractor)? How is the subcontractor rewarded for this risk taking?  Can you give examples and explain how this affect 
performance? 
18. How would you describe the subcontractor willingness to bear PBC induced risks? In this respect, how would you describe the subcontract ability to influence the 
end customer performance? 
19. In case of PBC it is said that: "as the service provider is better able to balance risks and rewards, the more willing the service provider is to bear PBC induced 
risks". Do you agree with this statement? How are risks and rewards balanced in your case? Can you give examples and explain how this affect performance? What 
is the service providers view on risk and reward sharing with the subcontractor? 
Closing questions 
20. Access to complementary documents (e.g. contracts)? 
21. Suggestions for other interviewees and/or research issues? 
22. OK to come back for supplementary questions? 
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Appendix C Propositions and their relation 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Elements of the 7 proposition and their relation 
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Appendix D Interviewees of the research 
 
 
 
Position interviewee Company / 
Organization 
Role in this research 
Customer manager 1 Wiley Expert on behave if the customer: 
government solution architect for the 
global sustainment solution 
Customer manager 2 Joint Program Office, 
Integrated Product 
Team Propulsion 
Responsible for (PBL) sustainment 
contact with service provider. Drafting 
contract with  requirements. 
Customer manager 3 Joint Program Office, 
Integrated Product 
Team Propulsion 
Responsible for (PBL) sustainment 
contact with service provider. Providing 
requirements. 
Customer manager 4 Joint Program Office, 
Integrated Product 
Team Propulsion 
Responsible for (PBL) sustainment 
contact with service provider. Providing 
requirements. 
Service Provider manager 1 Pratt & Whitney Responsible for the (PBL) sustainment 
contact for the F135 
Service Provider manager 2 Pratt & Whitney Responsible for the (PBL) sustainment 
contact for the F135 
Service Provider manager 3 Pratt & Whitney Responsible for the (PBL) sustainment 
contact for the F135 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix E List of used documents 
 
Document name Description Version 
F-35 Lightning II 
Sustainment 
Performance 
Measurement Process 
Sets forth the methodology for conducting sustainment 
Performance Measurement to include performance 
metrics tracking and reporting pursuant to the terms and 
conditions of the individual Air System Contractor (ASC) 
and the Propulsion System Contractor (PSC) Sustainment 
1 June 2015 
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 contracts.  
F-35 Program Office 
Propulsion Performance 
Based Logistics (PBL) 
Plan 
Sets forth the roles & responsibilities, management 
processes, performance reporting, and (incentivized) 
metric definitions pursuant to the terms and conditions 
of the Propulsion Product Support Integrator (PSI) 
sustainment contracts.  This document highlights 
everything necessary for how the PBL contract will be 
built, executed, and ultimately reported through the 
Sustainment Performance Management System (SPMS). 
It identifies infrastructure and tools required by the F-35 
Joint Program Office (JPO) and the PSI to evaluate and 
report performance measurement metrics and support 
decision making to ensure effective monitoring and 
control of propulsion sustainment performance. The 
Performance Work Statement (PWS) is part of the plan. 
22 February 
2016 
F135 Performance– 
Based Logistics 
Incentive Fee Plan 
Sets forth the incentive fee of FY17 – FY19 and consists 
of both a Cost Incentive and Performance Incentive 
2 March 2016 
Section J Attachment 10 Sets forth metric definitions and calculation 
methodologies. 
11 February 
2016 
Memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) 
concerning the 
production, 
sustainment  and 
Follow-on development 
of the Joint Strike 
Fighter (Short Title – JSF 
PSFD MOU) 
Sets forth the framework for the production, 
sustainment and Follow-on development of the F-35 for 
the Participants (services and partners). 
14 November 
2006 
 
Appendix F Influencing factors level of substantiation 
 
 
 
The seven studied factors Is the factor substantiated in: 
Literature Interviews Documents 
1 Service provider’s performance attributability yes yes yes (indirectly by 
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    exclusions and SLA) 
2 Length of the contract yes yes yes, indirectly 
3 Ability to make accurate forecasts yes yes, direct and 
indirectly 
yes, indirectly 
4 Growth path towards toward full PBC yes yes, direct and 
indirectly 
yes, indirectly 
5 Transfer risk to the subcontractor(s) yes yes No; contracts not 
investigated 
6 Balance risks across the service supply chain yes yes No; contracts not 
investigated 
7 Relational governance yes yes No; not supported 
 
